Saturday, July 16, 2011

So you think you understand the cosmological argument?

Most people who comment on the cosmological argument demonstrably do not know what they are talking about.  This includes all the prominent New Atheist writers.  It very definitely includes most of the people who hang out in Jerry Coyne’s comboxes.  It also includes most scientists.  And it even includes many theologians and philosophers, or at least those who have not devoted much study to the issue.  This may sound arrogant, but it is not.  You might think I am saying “I, Edward Feser, have special knowledge about this subject that has somehow eluded everyone else.”  But that is NOT what I am saying.  The point has nothing to do with me.  What I am saying is pretty much common knowledge among professional philosophers of religion (including atheist philosophers of religion), who – naturally, given the subject matter of their particular philosophical sub-discipline – are the people who know more about the cosmological argument than anyone else does. 

In particular, I think that the vast majority of philosophers who have studied the argument in any depth – and again, that includes atheists as well as theists, though it does not include most philosophers outside the sub-discipline of philosophy of religion – would agree with the points I am about to make, or with most of them anyway.  Of course, I do not mean that they would all agree with me that the argument is at the end of the day a convincing argument.  I just mean that they would agree that most non-specialists who comment on it do not understand it, and that the reasons why people reject it are usually superficial and based on caricatures of the argument.  Nor do I say that every single self-described philosopher of religion would agree with the points I am about to make.  Like every other academic field, philosophy of religion has its share of hacks and mediocrities.  But I am saying that the vast majority of philosophers of religion would agree, and again, that this includes the atheists among them as well as the theists.

I’m not going to present and defend any version of the cosmological argument here.  I’ve done that at length in my books Aquinas and The Last Superstition, and it needs to be done at length rather than in the context of a blog post.  The reason is that, while the basic structure of the main versions of the argument is fairly simple, the background metaphysics necessary to a proper understanding of the key terms and inferences is not.  It needs some spelling out, which is why Aquinas and The Last Superstition each devote a long chapter to general metaphysics before addressing the question of God’s existence.  The serious objections to the argument can in my view all be answered, but that too can properly be done only after the background ideas have been set out.  And that too is a task carried out in the books.

I will deal here with some of the non-serious objections, though.  In particular, what follows is intended to clear away some of the intellectual rubbish that prevents many people from giving the argument a fair hearing.  To get to the point(s), then:

1. The argument does NOT rest on the premise that “Everything has a cause.”

Lots of people – probably most people who have an opinion on the matter – think that the cosmological argument goes like this: Everything has a cause; so the universe has a cause; so God exists.  They then have no trouble at all poking holes in it.  If everything has a cause, then what caused God?  Why assume in the first place that everything has to have a cause?  Why assume the cause is God?  Etc.

Here’s the funny thing, though.  People who attack this argument never tell you where they got it from.  They never quote anyone defending it.  There’s a reason for that.  The reason is that none of the best-known proponents of the cosmological argument in the history of philosophy and theology ever gave this stupid argument.  Not Plato, not Aristotle, not al-Ghazali, not Maimonides, not Aquinas, not Duns Scotus, not Leibniz, not Samuel Clarke, not Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, not Mortimer Adler, not William Lane Craig, not Richard Swinburne.  And not anyone else either, as far as I know.  (Your Pastor Bob doesn’t count.  I mean no one among prominent philosophers.)  And yet it is constantly presented, not only by popular writers but even by some professional philosophers, as if it were “the” “basic” version of the cosmological argument, and as if every other version were essentially just a variation on it.

Don’t take my word for it.  The atheist Robin Le Poidevin, in his book Arguing for Atheism (which my critic Jason Rosenhouse thinks is pretty hot stuff) begins his critique of the cosmological argument by attacking a variation of the silly argument given above – though he admits that “no-one has defended a cosmological argument of precisely this form”!  So what’s the point of attacking it?  Why not start instead with what some prominent defender of the cosmological argument has actually said?

Suppose some creationist began his attack on Darwinism by assuring his readers that “the basic” claim of the Darwinian account of human origins is that at some point in the distant past a monkey gave birth to a human baby.  Suppose he provided no source for this claim – which, of course, he couldn’t have, because no Darwinian has ever said such a thing – and suppose also that he admitted that no one has ever said it.  But suppose further that he claimed that “more sophisticated versions” of Darwinism were really just “modifications” of this claim.  Intellectually speaking, this would be utterly contemptible and sleazy.  It would give readers the false impression that anything Darwinians have to say about human origins, however superficially sophisticated, is really just a desperate exercise in patching up a manifestly absurd position.  Precisely for that reason, though, such a procedure would, rhetorically speaking, be very effective indeed.

Compare that to Le Poidevin’s procedure.  Though by his own admission no one has ever actually defended the feeble argument in question, Le Poidevin still calls it “the basic” version of the cosmological argument and characterizes the “more sophisticated versions” he considers later on as “modifications” of it.  Daniel Dennett does something similar in his book Breaking the Spell.  He assures us that the lame argument in question is “the simplest form” of the cosmological argument and falsely insinuates that other versions – that is to say, the ones that philosophers have actually defended, and which Dennett does not bother to discuss – are merely desperate attempts to repair the obvious problems with the “Everything has a cause” “version.”  As with our imaginary creationist, this procedure is intellectually dishonest and sleazy, but it is rhetorically very effective.  It gives the unwary reader the false impression that “the basic” claim made by Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. is manifestly absurd, that everything else they have to say is merely an attempt to patch up this absurd position, and (therefore) that such writers need not be bothered with further.

And that, I submit, is the reason why the stupid “Everything has a cause” argument – a complete fabrication, an urban legend, something no philosopher has ever defended – perpetually haunts the debate over the cosmological argument.  It gives atheists an easy target, and a way rhetorically to make even their most sophisticated opponents seem silly and not worth bothering with.  It‘s a slimy debating trick, nothing more – a shameless exercise in what I have elsewhere called “meta-sophistry.”  (I make no judgment about whether Le Poidevin’s or Dennett’s sleaziness was deliberate.  But that they should know better is beyond question.)

What defenders of the cosmological argument do say is that what comes into existence has a cause, or that what is contingent has a cause.  These claims are as different from “Everything has a cause” as “Whatever has color is extended” is different from “Everything is extended.”  Defenders of the cosmological argument also provide arguments for these claims about causation.  You may disagree with the claims – though if you think they are falsified by modern physics, you are sorely mistaken – but you cannot justly accuse the defender of the cosmological argument either of saying something manifestly silly or of contradicting himself when he goes on to say that God is uncaused.

This gives us what I regard as “the basic” test for determining whether an atheist is informed and intellectually honest.  If he thinks that the cosmological argument rests on the claim that “everything has a cause,” then he is simply ignorant of the basic facts.  If he persists in asserting that it rests on this claim after being informed otherwise, then he is intellectually dishonest.  And if he is an academic philosopher like Le Poidevin or Dennett who is professionally obligated to know these things and to eschew cheap debating tricks, then… well, you do the math.

2. “What caused God?” is not a serious objection to the argument.

Part of the reason this is not a serious objection is that it usually rests on the assumption that the cosmological argument is committed to the premise that “Everything has a cause,” and as I’ve just said, this is simply not the case.  But there is another and perhaps deeper reason.

The cosmological argument in its historically most influential versions is not concerned to show that there is a cause of things which just happens not to have a cause.  It is not interested in “brute facts” – if it were, then yes, positing the world as the ultimate brute fact might arguably be as defensible as taking God to be.  On the contrary, the cosmological argument – again, at least as its most prominent defenders (Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, et al.) present it – is concerned with trying to show that not everything can be a “brute fact.”  What it seeks to show is that if there is to be an ultimate explanation of things, then there must be a cause of everything else which not only happens to exist, but which could not even in principle have failed to exist.  And that is why it is said to be uncaused – not because it is an arbitrary exception to a general rule, not because it merely happens to be uncaused, but rather because it is not the sort of thing that can even in principle be said to have had a cause, precisely because it could not even in principle have failed to exist in the first place.  And the argument doesn’t merely assume or stipulate that the first cause is like this; on the contrary, the whole point of the argument is to try to show that there must be something like this.

Different versions of the cosmological argument approach this task in different ways.  Aristotelian versions argue that change – the actualization of the potentials inherent in things – cannot in principle occur unless there is a cause that is “pure actuality,” and thus can actualize other things without itself having to be actualized.  Neo-Platonic versions argue that composite things cannot in principle exist unless there is a cause of things that is absolutely unified or non-composite.  Thomists not only defend the Aristotelian versions, but also argue that whatever has an essence or nature distinct from its existence – so that it must derive existence from something outside it – must ultimately be caused by something whose essence just is existence, and which qua existence or being itself need not derive its existence from another.  Leibnizian versions argue that whatever does not have the sufficient reason for its existence in itself must ultimately derive its existence from something which does have within itself a sufficient reason for its existence, and which is in that sense necessary rather than contingent.  And so forth.  (Note that I am not defending or even stating the arguments here, but merely giving single sentence summaries of the general approach several versions of the arguments take.)

So, to ask “What caused God?” really amounts to asking “What caused the thing that cannot in principle have had a cause?”, or “What actualized the potentials in that thing which is pure actuality and thus never had any potentials of any sort needing to be actualized in the first place?”, or “What imparted a sufficient reason for existence to that thing which has its sufficient reason for existence within itself and did not derive it from something else?”  And none of these questions makes any sense.  Of course, the atheist might say that he isn’t convinced that the cosmological argument succeeds in showing that there really is something that could not in principle have had a cause, or that is purely actual, or that has a sufficient reason for its existence within itself.  He might even try to argue that there is some sort of hidden incoherence in these notions.  But merely to ask “What caused God?” – as if the defender of the cosmological argument had overlooked the most obvious of objections – simply misses the whole point.  A serious critic has to grapple with the details of the arguments.  He cannot short-circuit them with a single smart-ass question.  (If some anonymous doofus in a combox can think up such an objection, then you can be certain that Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. already thought of it too.)

3. “Why assume that the universe had a beginning?” is not a serious objection to the argument.

The reason this is not a serious objection is that no version of the cosmological argument assumes this at all.  Of course, the kalām cosmological argument does claim that the universe had a beginning, but it doesn’t merely assume it.  Rather, the whole point of that version of the cosmological argument is to establish through detailed argument that the universe must have had a beginning.  You can try to rebut those arguments, but to pretend that one can dismiss the argument merely by raising the possibility of an infinite series of universes (say) is to miss the whole point.

The main reason this is a bad objection, though, is that most versions of the cosmological argument do not even claim that the universe had a beginning.  Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Thomistic, and Leibnizian cosmological arguments are all concerned to show that there must be an uncaused cause even if the universe has always existed.  Of course, Aquinas did believe that the world had a beginning, but (as all Aquinas scholars know) that is not a claim that plays any role in his versions of the cosmological argument.  When he argues there that there must be a First Cause, he doesn’t mean “first” in the order of events extending backwards into the past.  What he means is that there must be a most fundamental cause of things which keeps them in existence at every moment, whether or not the series of moments extends backwards into the past without a beginning.

In fact, Aquinas rather famously rejected what is now known as the kalām argument.  He did not think that the claim that the universe had a beginning could be established through philosophical arguments.  He thought it could be known only via divine revelation, and thus was not suitable for use in trying to establish God’s existence.  (Here, by the way, is another basic test of competence to speak on this subject.  Any critic of the Five Ways who claims that Aquinas was trying to show that the universe had a beginning and that God caused that beginning – as Richard Dawkins does in his comments on the Third Way in The God Delusion – infallibly demonstrates thereby that he simply doesn’t know what he is talking about.)

4. “No one has given any reason to think that the First Cause is all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, etc.” is not a serious objection to the argument.

People who make this claim – like, again, Dawkins in The God Delusion – show thereby that they haven’t actually read the writers they are criticizing.  They are typically relying on what other uninformed people have said about the argument, or at most relying on excerpts ripped from context and stuck into some anthology (as Aquinas’s Five Ways so often are).  Aquinas in fact devotes hundreds of pages across various works to showing that a First Cause of things would have to be all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, and so on and so forth.  Other Scholastic writers and modern writers like Leibniz and Samuel Clarke also devote detailed argumentation to establishing that the First Cause would have to have the various divine attributes.

Of course, an atheist might try to rebut these various arguments.  But to pretend that they don’t exist – that is to say, to pretend, as so many do, that defenders of the cosmological argument typically make an undefended leap from “There is a First Cause” to “There is a cause of the world that is all-powerful, all-knowing, etc.” – is, once again, simply to show that one doesn’t know what one is talking about.

5. “The argument doesn’t prove that Christianity is true” is not a serious objection to the argument.

No one claims that the cosmological argument by itself suffices to show that Christianity is true, that Jesus of Nazareth was God Incarnate, etc.  That’s not what it is intended to do.  It is intended to establish only what Christians, Jews, Muslims, philosophical theists, and other monotheists hold in common, viz. the view that there is a divine cause of the universe.  Establishing the truth of specifically Christian claims about this divine cause requires separate arguments, and no one has ever pretended otherwise.

It would also obviously be rather silly for an atheist to pretend that unless the argument gets you all the way to proving the truth of Christianity, specifically, then there is no point in considering it.  For if the argument works, that would suffice all by itself to refute atheism.  It would show that the real debate is not between atheism and theism, but between the various brands of theism.  

6. “Science has shown such-and-such” is not a serious objection to (most versions of) the argument.

There are versions of the cosmological argument that appeal to scientific considerations – most notably, the version of the kalām argument defended by William Lane Craig.  But even Craig’s argument also appeals to separate, purely philosophical considerations that do not stand or fall with the current state of things in cosmology or physics.  And most versions of the cosmological argument do not in any way depend on particular scientific claims.  Rather, they start with extremely general considerations that any possible scientific theorizing must itself take for granted – for example, that there is any empirical world at all, or any world of any sort at all.  

It is sometimes claimed (for example, by Anthony Kenny and J. L. Mackie) that some of Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence depend on outdated theses in Aristotelian physics.  But Thomists have had little difficulty in showing that this is false.  In fact the arguments depend only on claims of Aristotelian metaphysics which can be disentangled from any outdated scientific assumptions and shown to be defensible whatever the scientific details turn out to be, precisely because (so the Thomist argues) they concern what any possible scientific theory has to presuppose.  (Naturally, I address this issue in Aquinas.)

Of course, many atheists are committed to scientism, and maintain that there are no rational forms of inquiry other than science.  But unless they provide an argument for this claim, they are merely begging the question against the defender of the cosmological argument, whose position is precisely that there are rational arguments that are distinct from, and indeed more fundamental than, empirical scientific arguments.  Moreover, defending scientism is no easy task – in fact the view is simply incoherent, or so I would argue (as I have in several previous posts).  Be that as it may, merely shouting “Science!” doesn’t prove anything.  

7. The argument is not a “God of the gaps” argument.

Since the point of the argument is precisely to explain (part of) what science itself must take for granted, it is not the sort of thing that could even in principle be overturned by scientific findings.  For the same reason, it is not an attempt to plug some current “gap” in scientific knowledge.  Nor is it, in its historically most influential versions anyway, a kind of “hypothesis” put forward as the “best explanation” of the “evidence.”  It is rather an attempt at strict metaphysical demonstration.  To be sure, like empirical science it begins with empirical claims, but they are empirical claims that are so extremely general that (as I have said) science itself cannot deny them without denying its own evidential and metaphysical presuppositions.  And it proceeds from these premises, not by probabilistic theorizing, but via strict deductive reasoning.  In this respect, to suggest (as Richard Dawkins does) that the cosmological argument fails to consider more “parsimonious” explanations than an uncaused cause is like saying that the Pythagorean theorem is merely a “theorem of the gaps” and that more “parsimonious” explanations of the “geometrical evidence” might be forthcoming.  It simply misunderstands the nature of the reasoning involved.

Of course, an atheist might reject the very possibility of such metaphysical demonstration.  He might claim that there cannot be a kind of argument which, like mathematics, leads to necessary truths and yet which, like science, starts from empirical premises.  But if so, he has to provide a separate argument for this assertion.  Merely to insist that there cannot be such an argument simply begs the question against the cosmological argument.

None of this entails that the cosmological argument is not open to potential criticism.  The point is that the kind of criticism one might try to raise against it is simply not the kind that one might raise in the context of empirical science.  It requires instead knowledge of metaphysics and philosophy more generally.  But that naturally brings us to the next point:

8. Hume and Kant did not have the last word on the argument.  Neither has anyone else.

It is often claimed that Hume, or maybe Kant, essentially had the last word on the subject of the cosmological argument and that nothing significant has been or could be said in its defense since their time.  I think that no philosopher who has made a special study of the argument would agree with this judgment, and again, that includes atheistic philosophers who ultimately reject the argument.  For example, I don’t think anyone who has studied the issue would deny that Elizabeth Anscombe presented a serious objection to Hume’s claim that something could conceivably come into existence without a cause.  Nor is Anscombe by any means the only philosopher to have criticized Hume on this issue.  I’m not claiming that everyone would agree that the objections leveled by Anscombe and others are at the end of the day correct (though I think they are), only that they would agree that it is wrong to pretend that Hume somehow ended all serious debate on the issue.  (Naturally, I discuss this issue in Aquinas.)

To take another example, Hume’s objection that the cosmological argument commits a fallacy of composition is, as I have noted in an earlier post, also greatly overrated.  For one thing, it assumes that the cosmological argument is concerned with explaining why the universe as a whole exists, and that is simply not true of all versions of the argument.  Thomists often emphasize that the argument of Aquinas’s On Being and Essence requires only the premise that something or other exists – a stone, a tree, a book, your left shoe, whatever.  The claim is that none of these things could exist even for an instant unless maintained in being by God.  You don’t need to start the argument with any fancy premise about the universe as a whole; all you need is a premise to the effect that a stone exists, or a shoe, or what have you.  (Again, see Aquinas for the full story.)  Even versions of the argument that do begin with a premise about the universe as a whole are (in my view and that of many others) not really damaged by Hume’s objection, for reasons I explain in the post just linked to.  In any event, I think that anyone who has studied the cosmological argument in any depth would agree that it is certainly seriously debatable whether Hume draws any blood here.  

In general, critics of the cosmological argument tend arbitrarily to hold it to a standard to which they do not hold other arguments.  In other areas of philosophy, even the most problematic views are treated as worthy of continuing debate.  The fact that there are all sorts of serious objections to materialist theories of the mind, or consequentialist views in ethics, or Rawlsian liberal views in political philosophy, does not lead anyone to suggest that these views shouldn’t be taken seriously.  But the fact that someone somewhere raised such-and-such an objection to the cosmological argument is routinely treated as if this sufficed to establish that the argument has been decisively “refuted” and needn’t be paid any further attention.

Jason Rosenhouse plays this game in his response to my recent post on Jerry Coyne.  Writes Rosenhouse:

Feser seems rather taken with [the cosmological argument], but there are many strong refutations to be found in the literature.  Off the top of my head, I found Mackie's discussion in The Miracle of Theism and Robin Le Poidevin's discussion in Arguing for Atheism to be both cogent and accessible.  

Does Rosenhouse really think that we defenders of the cosmological argument aren’t familiar with Mackie and Le Poidevin?  Presumably not.  But then, what’s his point?  That is to say, what point is he trying to make that doesn’t manifestly beg the question?  After all, what would Rosenhouse think of the following “objection”:

Rosenhouse seems rather taken with the materialist view of the mind, but there are many strong refutations to be found in the literature.  Off the top of my head, I found Foster’s The Immaterial Self and the essays in Koons’ and Bealer’s The Waning of Materialism to be both cogent and accessible.

Or, while we’re on the subject of what prominent mainstream atheist philosophers have said, what would he think of:

Rosenhouse seems rather taken with Darwinism, but there are many strong refutations to be found in the literature.  Off the top of my head, I found Fodor’s and Piatelli-Palmarini’s discussion in What Darwin Got Wrong and David Stove’s discussion in Darwinian Fairytales to be both cogent and accessible.

Rosenhouse’s answer to both “objections” would, I imagine, be: “Since when did Foster, Koons, Bealer, Fodor, Piatelli-Palmarini, and Stove get the last word on these subjects?”  And that would be a good answer.  But no less good is the following answer to Rosenhouse: Since when did Mackie and Le Poidevin have the last word on the cosmological argument?  

“But that’s different!” I imagine Rosenhouse would say.  But how is it different?  This brings us to one last point:

9. What “most philosophers” think about the argument is irrelevant.

Presumably, the difference is in Rosenhouse’s view summed up in another remark he makes in his post, viz. “There's a reason most philosophers are atheists” (he cites this survey as evidence).  By contrast, most philosophers are not dualists or critics of Darwinism (though in fact the number of prominent dualists is not negligible, but let that pass).  Now if what Rosenhouse means to imply is that philosophers who have made a special study of the cosmological argument now tend to agree that it is no longer worthy of serious consideration, then for reasons already stated, he is quite wrong about that.  But what he probably means to imply is rather that since most contemporary academic philosophers in general are atheists, we should conclude that the cosmological argument isn’t worth serious consideration.

But what does this little statistic really mean?  I’ll let Mr. Natural tell us what it means.  Because Rosenhouse’s little crack really amounts to little more than a fallacious appeal to authority-cum-majority.  What “most philosophers” think could be relevant to the subject at hand only if we could be confident that academic philosophers in general, and not just philosophers of religion, were both competent to speak on the cosmological argument and reasonably objective about it.  And in fact there is good reason to think that neither condition holds.

Consider first that, as I have documented in several previous posts (here, here, and here) prominent philosophers who are not specialists in the philosophy of religion often say things about the cosmological argument that are demonstrably incompetent.  Consider further that those who do specialize in areas of philosophy concerned with arguments like the cosmological argument do not tend to be atheists, as I noted here.  If expertise counts for anything – and New Atheist “Learn the science!” types are always insisting that it does – then surely we cannot dismiss the obvious implication that those who actually bother to study arguments like the cosmological argument in depth are more likely to regard them as serious arguments, and even as convincing arguments.

Now the New Atheist will maintain that the direction of causality goes the other way.  It isn’t that studying the cosmological argument in detail tends to lead one to take religious belief seriously, they will say.  It’s rather that people who already take religious belief seriously tend to be more likely to study the cosmological argument.  Of course, it would be nice to hear a non-question-begging reason for thinking that this is all that is going on.  And there is reason for doubting that this can be all that is going on.  After all, there are lots of other arguments and ideas supportive of religion that academic philosophers of religion do not devote much attention to – young earth creationism, spiritualism, and the like.  Evidently, the reason they devote more attention to the cosmological argument is that they sincerely believe, on the basis of their knowledge of it, that the argument is worthy of serious study in a way these other ideas are not, and not merely because they are predisposed to accept its conclusion.

The objection in question is also one that cuts both ways.  For why suppose that the atheist philosophers are more objective than the theist ones?  In particular, why should we be so confident that most philosophers (outside philosophy of religion) are atheists because they’ve seriously studied arguments like the cosmological argument and found them wanting?  Why not conclude instead that, precisely because they tend for other reasons to be atheists, they haven’t bothered to study arguments like the cosmological argument very seriously?  The cringe-making remarks some of them make about the argument certainly provides support for this suspicion.  (Again, I give examples here, here, and here.)

And there is other reason for suspicion.  After all, as philosophers with no theological ax to grind sometimes complain – see here and here for a few examples – their colleagues can too often be smugly insular and ill-informed about sub-disciplines outside their own and about the history of their own field.  And like other academics, they can be unreflective, dogmatic, and uninformed in their secularism.  Here too you don’t have to take my word for it.  Many prominent secular philosophers themselves have noted the same thing.  

Hence Thomas Nagel opines that a “fear of religion” seems often to underlie the work of his fellow secularist intellectuals, and that it has had “large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life.”  He continues:

I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers.  It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief.  It's that I hope there is no God!  I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.  My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time.  One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about human life, including everything about the human mindThis is a somewhat ridiculous situation… [I]t is just as irrational to be influenced in one’s beliefs by the hope that God does not exist as by the hope that God does exist. (The Last Word, pp. 130-131)

Jeremy Waldron tells us that:

Secular theorists often assume they know what a religious argument is like: they present it as a crude prescription from God, backed up with threat of hellfire, derived from general or particular revelation, and they contrast it with the elegant complexity of a philosophical argument by Rawls (say) or Dworkin.  With this image in mind, they think it obvious that religious argument should be excluded from public life... But those who have bothered to make themselves familiar with existing religious-based arguments in modern political theory know that this is mostly a travesty... (God, Locke, and Equality, p. 20)

Tyler Burge opines that “materialism is not established, or even clearly supported, by science” and that its hold over his peers is analogous to that of a “political or religious ideology” (“Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice,” in John Heil and Alfred Mele, eds., Mental Causation, p. 117)

John Searle tells us that “materialism is the religion of our time,” that “like more traditional religions, it is accepted without question and… provides the framework within which other questions can be posed, addressed, and answered,” and that “materialists are convinced, with a quasi-religious faith, that their view must be right” (Mind: A Brief Introduction, p. 48)

William Lycan admits, in what he himself calls “an uncharacteristic exercise in intellectual honesty,” that the arguments for materialism are no better than the arguments against it, that his “own faith in materialism is based on science-worship,” and that “we also always hold our opponents to higher standards of argumentation than we obey ourselves.” (“Giving Dualism its Due,” a paper presented at the 2007 Australasian Association of Philosophy conference at the University of New England)

The atheist philosopher of religion Quentin Smith maintains that “the great majority of naturalist philosophers have an unjustified belief that naturalism is true and an unjustified belief that theism (or supernaturalism) is false.”  For their naturalism typically rests on nothing more than an ill-informed “hand waving dismissal of theism” which ignores “the erudite brilliance of theistic philosophizing today.”  Smith continues:

If each naturalist who does not specialize in the philosophy of religion (i.e., over ninety-nine percent of naturalists) were locked in a room with theists who do specialize in the philosophy of religion, and if the ensuing debates were refereed by a naturalist who had a specialization in the philosophy of religion, the naturalist referee could at most hope the outcome would be that “no definite conclusion can be drawn regarding the rationality of faith,” although I expect the most probable outcome is that the naturalist, wanting to be a fair and objective referee, would have to conclude that the theists definitely had the upper hand in every single argument or debate.

Due to the typical attitude of the contemporary naturalist… the vast majority of naturalist philosophers have come to hold (since the late 1960s) an unjustified belief in naturalism. Their justifications have been defeated by arguments developed by theistic philosophers, and now naturalist philosophers, for the most part, live in darkness about the justification for naturalism. They may have a true belief in naturalism, but they have no knowledge that naturalism is true since they do not have an undefeated justification for their belief.  If naturalism is true, then their belief in naturalism is accidentally true.  [“The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” Philo: A Journal of Philosophy (Fall-Winter 2001)]

Again, Nagel, Waldron, Burge, Searle, Lycan, and Smith are not apologists for religion.  Apart from Smith, they aren’t even philosophers of religion.  All of them are prominent, and all of them are “mainstream.”  They have no motive for saying the things they do other than that that is the way things honestly strike them based on their knowledge of the field.

But scientists shouldn’t get smug over lapses in objectivity among philosophers.  For at least where philosophical matters are concerned, many scientists are hardly more competent or objective, as we have seen in an earlier post, and as the embarrassing philosophical efforts of Richard Dawkins and Stephen Hawking illustrate.  And if you think even their “purely scientific” pronouncements are always free of anything but good old tough-minded “just the facts, ma’am” objectivity… well, as Dawkins will tell you, you shouldn’t believe fairy tales.  Biologist Richard Lewontin let the cat out of the bag some time ago:

Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural.  We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.  It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated.  Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.  [From a review of Carl Sagan's The Demon-Haunted World in the New York Review of Books (January 9, 1997)]

But here’s the bottom line.  The “What do respectable people say?” stuff that Rosenhouse, Coyne, and other New Atheists are always engaging in is juvenile, and futile too, since they are never able to tell us what counts as “respectable” in a way that doesn’t beg all the questions at issue.  It is amazing how much time and energy New Atheist types put into trying to come up with ever more elaborate excuses for not engaging their critics’ actual arguments.  If that alone doesn’t make you suspicious, then I submit that you are not thinking critically.

Addendum: For two followup posts in reply to Jason Rosenhouse, go here and here.

512 comments:

  1. Jerry:

    >> Could you not compute the probabilities of a series of coin-flips or dice-rolls without presupposing physical causality..and without leaping to the conclusion that the coin-flips or dice-rolls were uncaused?

    Of course you could, but you also know that the causes of the coin tosses and dice rolls are due to the physical forces of rotational motion, gravitational pull and air resistance. You know that these causes precede the effect of the outcome, and that the problem is not the absence of any causes, but the presence of too many causes.

    >> for scenario to prove what you want it to, you would have to stipulate that both fermions are identical and occupy the same point in space -- you seem to be confusing "indeterminate" and "uncaused". I think in your planned Quantum reading that you'll come to appreciate the difference.

    First, you seem to agree with Ben that it is the spatio-temporal location of the fermions that causes the decay, but then the burden of proof is for you to demonstrate what it is about those different locations that causes the decay in one fermion and not the other.

    Second, I am not confusing indeterminate with uncaused. I know the distinction well. Trust me. My point is that the quantum world is bizarre, and if we can give up things like locality for the sake of hidden variables, then perhaps there are other properties that can be given up, such as causality. I know it does not make sense, but that is the point. At the quantum level, it seems that our commonsense intuitions just seem to fail when it comes to understanding this level of reality.

    And again, I am not saying that these events are uncaused. I am saying that a case can be made that they are, and that the fact that this is so means that the cosmological argument is not as airtight as it seems. There is a whiff of doubt in one of its premises, and thus it cannot be used to establish its conclusions with the same certainty as before.

    The only way out is to explain what the causal antecedents of fermion decay are. Saying “reality” or “space-time” just doesn’t cut it, unless you can reliably show how some space-time distortions or changes seem to produce fermion decay, and others do not. Otherwise, this is all just hand waving in a heroic attempt to preserve an argument that may have been compromised.

    >> Fenyman is not the last word on Quantum Physics.

    I am well aware of the risk of an argument from authority, but the fact that he is an expert in this field gives me reason to give his opinions some weight. That said, I never said that because he said what he did that the matter was concluded. I just asked, as Steve asked, if someone could explain the antecedent efficient causes of fermion decay. If someone can do so, then Feynman is wrong. I have no problem with that.

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  2. GRodrigues: You Mr. Green are a propagator of heresies. [...] "The Foo Illusion" by the honorabale Mr. Fuawkins is a great place to start. Please stop this idiotic idea of Foo. It is the essence Fu that permeates the world and keeps it going.

    Hey! That was just a t̶y̶p̶o̶ uh, clever trick to distinguish the real Fu fighters from the pretenders! Yeah, that's it...!

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  3. dguller:

    Quickly..

    First, thank for the thoughtful replies.

    but you also know that the causes of the coin tosses and dice rolls are due to the physical forces of rotational motion, gravitational pull and air resistance

    Yes, and one could still compute the probabilities of dice-rolls rather accurately WITHOUT taking into consideration "the physical forces of rotational motion, gravitational pull and air resistance"...my uncle the craps player would astound you with his ability at this, and he doesn't know the first thing about physics, quantum or otherwise.

    First, you seem to agree with Ben that it is the spatio-temporal location of the fermions that causes the decay, but then the burden of proof is for you to demonstrate...

    I didn't assert that the location of the fermions that causes the decay, only that in leaving this out of your scenario, your claim that it proved non-causation was incomplete.

    My point is that the quantum world is bizarre

    Amen on that one, brother.

    As for the rest of it, IF it can be proven that these phenomena have no efficient cause, then the Causation principle is weakened. However, when Heisenberg's indeterminacy is understood not as describing the events themselves but rather our knowledge of the events, the Causal principle still holds rather nicely.

    Interesting possibilities, no?

    I must now wrest myself away from this computer before the Mrs. "dies of hunger" and the offspring revolt. Whatever quantum physics has to say about causation, my departure is definitely not uncaused....

    Take care,

    JB

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  4. dguller: "If there are empirical phenomena that make that change from potentially X to actually X in the utter absence of an actual external causal agent, then this key premise is compromised."

    It would seem (again to my simple mind) that there could not be any "potential X" if "actual X" were truly uncaused.

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  5. BenYachov,

    "djindra you need help or a hobby or a women."

    This is one of my hobbies and I already have a good woman.

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  6. Matt Dickinson: I have come across the idea that god is existence before, but couldn't work out if this subtly was part of the cosmological argument or an assumption of it.

    I would say not directly; the CA doesn't rely on any particular assumptions about what the Uncaused Cause would be like, it only shows that whatever it is, there must be one. However, then we can investigate what it must be like if it is uncaused; you can get to pure-existence that way. In fact, the next step goes straight to your question "Why can't the ultimate cause just be the universe?"

    Well, it could — at least as far as we can tell from the CA all by itself. When Aquinas finishes his argument with, "...and that's what everyone calls 'God'," he is not trying to sneak anything in. Most people would indeed call the Ultimate Independent Being "God", so he's just using that as the definition. If it turns out to be the universe itself, that's still "god" — in a pantheistic sense! Actually, I think it's in no small part because of the success of Scholastic philosophy in showing that this entity cannot be merely "the universe" that we have come to think of the term "God" as not being a name for the universe (or some impersonal "everything" force, like the Eastern philosophies you referred to).

    The catch with the universe is that it is contingent; that is, it is not logically necessary that it be the way it is. It would entirely possible to have different laws of physics, say. So there must be some reason why we have this universe and not some other one — and that reason of course, is what we call a "cause". (Well, Aquinas would. As this really long thread shows, there is some confusion between the typical modern scientific use of "cause" vs. the traditional philosophical use!) Therefore the uncaused Cause cannot be the universe; it has to be something which could not be any other way (logically necessary). And all we know for sure so far is that it exists....

    Similarly, the ultimate Being also could not have any parts, because for them to be parts, and not merely separate things, there would have to be some reason or cause why they constitute one thing. So no cause = no parts. This applies even to abstract parts, or parts that never could actually be separate, but can be identified as different parts only in thought. (E.g. you couldn't have prime matter ever existing by itself, but conceptually it is nonetheless distinct from any form with which it could be united; so prime matter still counts as a "part".) But if God had any properties, any essence, any nature apart from his existence (the only thing we know he does have!), then that too would entail some cause to explain that nature being joined with God's existence. So existence is therefore all that God could have!

    Thus the uncaused Cause could not be the universe — it has to be something more (pure existence) and at the same time something "less" (because it cannot have all the various features that the universe does, all its parts and complexity). The idea that there must exist Pure Existence itself in some ways feels very peculiar, but also feels very satisfying and elegant.

    I understand it's a complex subject however! Does the book cover and clear-up the misinterpretations and other philosophers (Leibniz etc)?

    It is indeed complex — I hope my whirlwind tour above is useful, but in his Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas takes nearly a dozen chapters to get that far (and that's after an additional dozen chapters of introductory material)! Feser's book on Aquinas is quite good about clearly explaining the arguments as they were intended — it does not spend much time on other philosophers, though it does have some occasional mentions. (I wish he'd write a whole book on Leibniz next!)

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  7. >This is one of my hobbies and I already have a good woman.

    All these posts of awesome physics & metaphysics and my petty insult is all you get out of this?

    Seriously?

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  8. BenYachov,

    "Primitive djindra: I don't know but it serves Primitive Feser's political agenda!"

    From TLS:

    "Disgust and distress over the New Atheism of Richard Dawkins and his ilk and the near total collapse of traditional morality represented by 'same-sex marriage' and related phenomena were only half of the motivation for my writing the essay that follows. The other half was disgust and distress over the largely inept and ineffective (as it seems to me) response to these developments put forward by many religious and political conservatives." -- page viii

    "As we shall see, the radical differences between these worldviews with respect to what at first glance might seem fairly abstruse questions of metaphysics -- the relationship between the universal and the particular, form and matter, substance and attributes, the nature of cause and effect, and so forth -- in fact have dramatic repercussions for religion, morality, and even politics." -- page 13

    "Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that virtually every major religious, moral, and political controversy of the last several decades -- of the last several centuries, in fact -- in some way rests on a disagreement, even if implicit and unnoticed, over the 'problem of universals' (as it is known)." -- page 42

    "...the very conservative, and very religious, consequences of realism and allied notions." -- page 49

    "this abandonment [of Aristotle!] has contributed to the civilizational crisis through which the West has been living for several centuries, and which has accelerated massively in the last century or so." -- page 51

    And this just scratches the surface. Feser is in this for the politics of it. That's clear and overt. He's simply selling the Straussian fable that there's a "crisis of the West" and it's the fault of a handful of philosophers.

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  9. BenYachov,

    Petty insults? Here? I'm shocked.

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  10. There's a real tour de force on page 258 of TLS. It demonstrates how crucial these philosophical questions can become. The water cycle is given as evidence for a chain of directedness: "condensation leads to precipitation, which leads to collection, which leads to evaporation, which leads to condensation, and the cycle begins again." The obvious conclusion we should draw from this is "the role of condensation in the water cycle, for example, is to bring about precipitation."

    That's how I look at it too. But my wife swears the role of precipitation is to bring about evaporation. That's the real Final Cause. And we've been arguing all night about it. I'm almost ready to admit she has a point. But as soon as I do she's going to rehash that chicken and egg thing again. And what surely follows is a denial of Aristotelian Final Cause because what really is a Final Cause anyway? Is there ever an end? As the cynic says, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."

    Cycles are an Aristotelian nightmare. I expect this argument will go round and round all night. Maybe Hume will put me out of my misery.

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  11. So the first cause argument is the bases of some phantom oppressive political ideology started by Aristotle?

    Tell us djindra this "girlfriend" of yours? She's a model right? She wears a bikini all day right and she is two dimensional? She never actually talks to you or says anything. She just appears when you put on the tin hat eh and only when your computer is on right?

    What's her name? Jenny-PEG?

    You are priceless buddy.

    But the sad fact remain there has been a lot of awesome physics and metaphysics in these posts & you have learned none of it.

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  12. Jason Rosenhouse lays Feser to waste here:


    http://scienceblogs.com/evolutionblog/2011/07/le_poidevin_on_the_cosmologica.php#more


    Like it or not, atheism matches the glittering complexity of the world described by physics. Atheism is true, and it will save the world.

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  13. BenYachov,

    We went on our first date in 1972 and have been a couple ever since. She's recently taken up acting now that we live in Hollywood. I'm quite proud of her, btw.

    http://www.imdb.com/name/nm3248094/

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  14. Anonymous,

    Good link. Feser should not be the one talking about the sleaze factor.

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  15. >We went on our first date in 1972 and have been a couple ever since. She's recently taken up acting now that we live in Hollywood. I'm quite proud of her, btw.

    Wow I was kidding about the Model/J-PEG thingy.........

    Step away slowly.......speak softly....of course she is an actress.

    No sudden moves people.

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  16. Mr Green:

    Thanks so much for taking the time to answer my questions so thoroughly and so well.

    I still have two things I'm struggling to get my head round:

    1. You say it is not logically necessary that the universe be the way it is, although we don't actually know whether the laws of physics could be different, but we can at least imagine other ways they could be, is this what you mean?

    2. If the universe is not the uncaused cause because it has parts and complexity (this sounds to me more like the ontological argument with parts detracting from the perfect being's perfection), then the uncaused cause cannot have parts/complexity, but god seems pretty complex. Yet again it seems more like the featureless Dao/Tao than 'god'.

    Of course if one could look at the universe from outside perhaps it would lack parts, it just appears complex because we are 'in' the universe.

    Sorry if I'm repeating myself, I'm trying to make sure I'm on the right track here and not putting my own biases into it.

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  17. >>djindra said... "the role of condensation in the water cycle, for example, is to bring about precipitation." That's how I look at it too. But my wife swears the role of precipitation is to bring about evaporation. That's the real Final Cause. And we've been arguing all night about it.

    Why in the world are you arguing over something which contains no contradiction? Is she as bad at philosophy as you are?

    >>Cycles are an Aristotelian nightmare. I expect this argument will go round and round all night. Maybe Hume will put me out of my misery.

    If you mean the cycle of you missing the point, everyone explaining it to you, and you just repeating yourself, then yeah. But reading Hume kills brain cells, so if you read enough, hey, you'll put all of us out of your misery.

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  18. Anonymous,

    "Why in the world are you arguing over something which contains no contradiction?"

    A cycle has no start and no end. The "final cause" of evaporation ends in evaporation itself, and the cycle continues. Nobody has explained to me how a cycle isn't a cycle. Why don't you take a stab?

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  19. >>djindra said... A cycle has no start and no end. The "final cause" of evaporation ends in evaporation itself, and the cycle continues. Nobody has explained to me how a cycle isn't a cycle. Why don't you take a stab?

    You're overthinking this -- well, that obviously isn't the right word, but you seem like you're trying to make problems where none exist. It's not that hard, really. Cycles consist of parts. If a cycle had only one part, it wouldn't be a cycle, it would just be a point. And each stage in the cycle is directed to the next. No problems, no contradictions. Say, you didn't think that "end" means the cycle stops, did you? You don't even need a special philosophy dictionary, an ordinary English dictionary will help you with that one.

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  20. Jerry:

    >> Yes, and one could still compute the probabilities of dice-rolls rather accurately WITHOUT taking into consideration "the physical forces of rotational motion, gravitational pull and air resistance"...my uncle the craps player would astound you with his ability at this, and he doesn't know the first thing about physics, quantum or otherwise.

    Yes, but we know what causes dice rolls. What we do not know is what the exact outcome of the dice rolls will be. All we know is the probability.

    Compare this to subatomic decay, and we do not know what causes it to happen. In addition to that, we do not know the exact outcome, except the probability calculation.

    So they are not comparable, I think. In the former, we know the causes, and the problem is that there are too many, and in the latter, we do not know the causes at all.

    >> I didn't assert that the location of the fermions that causes the decay, only that in leaving this out of your scenario, your claim that it proved non-causation was incomplete.

    The problem is that this is too vague. It is like saying that “something” caused it. That is not helpful unless you could show how this “something” was always present before the event, and that it was always absent in the absence of the event.

    >> As for the rest of it, IF it can be proven that these phenomena have no efficient cause, then the Causation principle is weakened. However, when Heisenberg's indeterminacy is understood not as describing the events themselves but rather our knowledge of the events, the Causal principle still holds rather nicely.

    Right. At some point, this is a matter of interpretation, and the fact that there are interpretations that work by involving causality, and there are interpretations that work by ignoring causality, means that this is an open question, and this is sufficient to undermine the cosmological argument. After all, it rests upon the certainty of its premises, and if one premise is uncertain, then the certainty of the conclusion also is weakened.

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  21. dguller,

    Did you read Mr. Green's (at least I think it was him) comment about efficient causality having to be present in physical objects at least in the essence-conjoined-to-existence sense?

    Also, there is no reason why physical efficient causality must be "outside" the object in question. Think of something that has "self-locomotion" for instance.

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  22. Michael:

    >> Did you read Mr. Green's (at least I think it was him) comment about efficient causality having to be present in physical objects at least in the essence-conjoined-to-existence sense?

    No, I didn’t. Where is it?

    >> Also, there is no reason why physical efficient causality must be "outside" the object in question. Think of something that has "self-locomotion" for instance.

    Yes, but self-locomotion is based upon an entity being composed of parts that move, and the moving parts must have an explanation for why they are moving. When we are talking about fermions, we have reached the bottom of matter at this time, and so there are no moving parts that we know of that make up the fermions. Therefore, your objection does not seem applicable unless you beg the question and assume that fermions must have smaller moving parts causing their decay, for example. If you have independent evidence to support this claim, then I am all ears, and I am sure that Steve is, as well.

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  23. dguller,

    Mr. Green's post is #400 at July 22, 2011 3:07 PM

    And I almost agree with your second point of your last post. But does physical efficient causality have to have moving parts, or is a distinction in the principles of the object in question possible too?

    ciao,
    Michael

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  24. Sorry, to clarify I should say a dependency of principles.

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  25. Michael:

    >> And I almost agree with your second point of your last post.

    Great!

    >> But

    Crap!

    >> does physical efficient causality have to have moving parts, or is a distinction in the principles of the object in question possible too?

    That is a great question. My understanding is that change requires motion of SOME kind. That is why I have such a hard time understanding how an Unmoved Mover can cause change at all. No motion = no change = not doing anything. I understand that a case can be made that this is just a failure of my conceptual imagination, and not a failure in the concepts involved. In other words, just because I cannot imagine how something occurs does not mean that it does not occur at all. However, it does not sit well with me.

    Getting back to your point, I would say that your underlying principles of the object are nothing but the underlying physical processes that are generating the change. If these processes are changing, then I would say that they would have to have moving parts involved in the change, which is ultimately about the transformation of energy.

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  26. I just discovered this blog.

    Excellent read.

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  27. Matt Dickinson: Thanks so much for taking the time to answer my questions so thoroughly and so well.

    It's always hard to deal with these issues thoroughly without writing a full paper, but I'm glad I made some sense! And no worry about asking questions, they are good ones.

    1. You say it is not logically necessary that the universe be the way it is, although we don't actually know whether the laws of physics could be different, but we can at least imagine other ways they could be, is this what you mean?

    Yes — well, I'd say we do know the laws of physics could be different in a purely logical sense. The constants could be different, or all the laws could be completely different. Of course, different laws would mean the universe would be different; so perhaps there is only one logically possible set of laws that could describe this universe, with all it contains. But the question is why do we have this universe at all, instead of a different one, or an empty one, etc.

    2. If the universe is not the uncaused cause because it has parts and complexity (this sounds to me more like the ontological argument with parts detracting from the perfect being's perfection), then the uncaused cause cannot have parts/complexity, but god seems pretty complex. Yet again it seems more like the featureless Dao/Tao than 'god'.

    In many ways, yes! On the classical view, God is utterly simple, as in not having any parts or distinctions. Of course, this is not something the human mind can really comprehend, so any descriptions of God use metaphor and analogy that cannot help but use the language of parts and complexity. Again, I wish I knew more about Eastern philosophy, but Taoistic language could also be applied to the First Cause (with varying degrees of metaphor/analogy). And Tao is sometimes compared to "negative theology" about God. Strictly speaking, this First Cause is ineffable, but we can "project" It onto concepts we can understand in a way that gives it the appearance of different aspects in different contexts (a bit like the six blind men and the elephant). And that's why Aquinas goes on to deal with separate questions about why God is "good", is "one", is "intelligent" (and what that means, and how it can be said of such a Being — for example, God's act of understanding must be equivalent to his existence for him not have parts, etc.).

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  28. dguller,

    “My understanding is that change requires motion of SOME kind.”

    Well, what do you mean by motion? I can see how local motion presupposes the idea of change put forth for the CA, but I don't see motion doing any explanatory work with regards to change. At most, with regards to the CA of Aquinas, you could claim, and rightly, that Aquinas means “change” whenever he uses the word “motion”.

    I suggest dropping this claim and focusing on the definition of change being used for the CA. You are right that it is hard to imagine some of the changes going on without imagining some kind of local motion, but then again, we can understand some things that we cannot imagine.

    “Getting back to your point, I would say that your underlying principles of the object are nothing but the underlying physical processes that are generating the change. If these processes are changing, then I would say that they would have to have moving parts involved in the change, which is ultimately about the transformation of energy.“

    I don't mind that you try to parallel scientific finds with the different parts of the CA argument (you might even be right, to some degree). But I'll have to say again that the CA doesn't depend on science; it's the other way around. That said, here's a thought experiment for efficient causality that doesn't seem to involve the notion of motion (RYMES!!! heehee), at least the notion of motion it seems like you are putting forth: Imagine a foot placed in the sand. From all eternity the foot and sand have been there. The footprint's efficient cause is the foot. Without the foot there would be no footprint. Yet there doesn't seem to be any local motion. The dependency of the footprint to the foot is enough for efficient causality.

    And the notion of efficient causality from this thought experiment can fall under Aquinas' use of the word change.

    Therefore, why can't a physical object have “within” itself a dependency of principles that are not separable except by philosophical analysis? I'm not making any claims with regards to current scientific theory, I'm only giving possibilities here.

    And thank you for the great discussion!

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  29. Michael:

    >> But I'll have to say again that the CA doesn't depend on science; it's the other way around.

    In an important sense, you are wrong, because it is based upon empirical observations from which certain generalizations are made. One important premise is that for an entity A to go from potentially X to actually X requires the intervention of an actual entity B. This is justified by a number of empirical phenomena, and then one generalizes to ALL empirical phenomena. If there are counter-examples to this generalization, then the generalization fails, and the argument fails with it. That is why quantum phenomena appear to prominently in this discussion.

    >> Imagine a foot placed in the sand. From all eternity the foot and sand have been there. The footprint's efficient cause is the foot. Without the foot there would be no footprint. Yet there doesn't seem to be any local motion. The dependency of the footprint to the foot is enough for efficient causality.

    How do we know that the foot is the cause of the footprint? Maybe the sand happened to be in the shape of the footprint and the foot is just resting within that imprint without causing it at all? It would be like there being a mould of my foot that I subsequently place my foot into. My foot is not the efficient cause of the footprint in that case, but is taking advantage of the imprint that was already there!

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  30. Mr. Green,

    Thanks once again, you and others have helped clear a lot of issues up, so I hope I can now say that 'yes, I do understand the cosmological argument' :)

    I still think science has/will have a lot to say on why we have this universe, multiverse theory or big bounce theory or Lee Smolin's universal reproduction theory for instance, but why a universe rather than none, well that's a pickle and a scientist has cannot currently comment on that. (As far as I know, I'm a biologist not a physicist.)

    If you are interested in getting into Eastern philosophy I recommend Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu and the Upanishads. I'm by no means an expert, but these pertain to what I've been talking about.

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  31. dguller,

    “In an important sense, you are wrong, because it is based upon empirical observations from which certain generalizations are made.“

    I agree that Aquinas' CA uses premises that are based upon empirical observations. I just disagree that all empirical observations fall under the realm of science. The definition of change you talk about is derived from an analysis of any experience of change; the nature of change is abstracted. It is not a matter of induction. If it were a matter of induction I would agree with your analysis. But attributing all possible knowledge of the empirical world to induction, is a philosophical error that goes all the way back to Ockham and before. It is based upon the denial of real essences. The empiricism strain of modern philosophy has generally tended this route. If I remember rightly, Hume would be one who fell into this error.

    This is one reason why I stand by my initial statement.

    “How do we know that the foot is the cause of the footprint?”

    You are right, logically there are other possibilities if you don't peek into the essences very deeply, though we still know that something caused the footprint. However, I was merely using the analogy as an illustration of one possibility: the kind of possibility that doesn't require local motion for efficient causality. It's a thought experiment to illustrate a point, change the thought experiment around if you would like.

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  32. Michael:

    >> I just disagree that all empirical observations fall under the realm of science. The definition of change you talk about is derived from an analysis of any experience of change; the nature of change is abstracted. It is not a matter of induction. If it were a matter of induction I would agree with your analysis. But attributing all possible knowledge of the empirical world to induction, is a philosophical error that goes all the way back to Ockham and before. It is based upon the denial of real essences. The empiricism strain of modern philosophy has generally tended this route. If I remember rightly, Hume would be one who fell into this error.

    Whether you want to call it “abstraction” or “induction”, the point is that we start with particular instances and infer a general pattern. If there are counter-examples to the general pattern, then it is no longer general, and actually has limitations. That was my point. If it is possible that at the quantum level there are uncaused events, then no matter how bizarre and strange this may be, then the cosmological argument is undermined, because a key premise is no longer intuitively obvious and indubitable.

    I can easily say that just because this is incomprehensible, it does not follow that it is impossible or incoherent. The same point was made to me regarding my inability to conceive of how Pure Act is supposed to do anything without itself changing in the process, because all my experience and understanding of change requires the cause to change, as well as the effect. So, if this point works in that context, then it equally applies in this context, too.

    >> However, I was merely using the analogy as an illustration of one possibility: the kind of possibility that doesn't require local motion for efficient causality. It's a thought experiment to illustrate a point, change the thought experiment around if you would like.

    That is why I am always suspicious of thought experiments. They are philosophical fairy tales that may or may not be relevant to reality. They are useful as intuition pumps, as Dennett called them. In other words, they allow us to intellectually alter certain features of our experience of the world in our minds, and see what might follow from those changes. It is kind of like conducting an experiment in our minds by varying different conditions, and observing the outcome. The problem is that there is no way to test whether the outcomes actually do follow, because it is all in our minds, and thus you can modify the conditions any way to want to get any outcome you want. I think they are too flexible to be very useful.

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  33. dguller,

    "Whether you want to call it “abstraction” or “induction”, the point is that we start with particular instances and infer a general pattern."

    No. Inference is not being made with regard to the relevant definition of change. There is no possibility of finding a counter-example any more than it would be possible for a round-square to exist. This is not induction and it is vital to understand this point. Not all knowledge based on experience is inductive...

    For example, I could ask how do I ever “know” that other people have minds like I do. I only have one sample to go off of (my own), so it doesn't make much of a good induction. But I “know” that other people do have minds because I understand something of what it is to have a rational nature and apprehend that same nature in others, and every single one of them (if I meet them or not).

    So back to the point at hand: I take any experience of genuine change and apprehend the basic structure of change. Now anytime I find an instance of change, I will be able to apprehend that same basic structure. The definition of change encompasses any possible kind of change that can possibly exist!

    Now, if you want to talk about one of the major errors of empiricism, I would be more than happy to go that direction. We could even talk about the laws of logic and how it doesn't make sense to say that maybe there is some universe that the laws of logic do not apply (a claim that I think is related to empiricism). But it is vital to understand that Aquinas sees his arguments as deductive proofs that have empirical premises, not arrived at by induction, but apprehended from the nature of the world.


    As for thought experiments, they can help the mind apprehend something that it is missing. They can be very helpful when something is not really in the realm of induction but instead is in the realm of rational apprehension. It makes sense that someone would mostly reject thought experiments if they only relied on induction, denied essences, and relied on the modern flavor of empiricism (perhaps someone like a Dennet?). Of course, I'm not denying that there are good thought experiments and bad thought experiments.

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  34. I keep thinking I might join in, but often enough dguller is bringing up many of the points I would, so until now I've been viewing from the side-lines.

    In much of what I've seen from Thomistic arguments (here and elsewhere) there still seems to be various assertions whose rationalizations seem dubious (the Thomistic value theory as far as I have seen is particularly unpersuasive), and sometimes there seems to this sort of slippage between the a priori and a posteriori. It's as if the Thomist wants to keep things a priori so that the argument if sound is "undoubtable" and safe from empirical claims (and becomes "necessary for empiricism to even occur"). Of course that makes for a convenient safe-guard for anyone whose other religious beliefs do not hold up well to empirical scrutiny ;-)

    But whenever we would like to ask "what types of entities are you talking about?" the appeal is necessarily to real world examples. Which of course is empirical. It's when I see the Thomistic claims mapping to real world examples that it shows the mapping does not seem to be terribly cogent. But question this and it seems the slip goes back to a priori "But, this is a pre-empirical argument!"

    I don't see any reason to buy the Thomist claims, thus far. But I do appreciate the civil effort of several people here to discuss various Thomistic arguments/claims.

    There's also the strange situation I've mentioned in another thread: the very fact that God supposedly gave man some form of Special Revelation (in The Bible), yet when asked for the "best" arguments for the existence of God, it's: " The All Mighty gave a revelation a good shot and all, but if we want REALLY good reasons for believing in a God, let's dust off these old tomes from a medieval theologian, who incorporated concepts from an earlier Greek philosopher..."



    RH

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  35. Michael said...

    Inference is not being made with regard to the relevant definition of change. There is no possibility of finding a counter-example any more than it would be possible for a round-square to exist. This is not induction and it is vital to understand this point.

    That's your claim, but forgive me (and apparently dguller) for not just taking your word for it.
    It needs to be argued for. But there seems to be a problem when you argue for it:

    I could ask how do I ever “know” that other people have minds like I do. I only have one sample to go off of (my own), so it doesn't make much of a good induction. But I “know” that other people do have minds because I understand something of what it is to have a rational nature and apprehend that same nature in others, and every single one of them (if I meet them or not)..

    Then you are making an inductive inference, whether you protest this or not.

    If you just wanted to stick to describing your own experience of your mind, that's one thing. But you are talking about "knowledge" of minds beyond your own. And it's clear you are extrapolating from a specific instance (your mind) to a generalization (that other minds will have X qualities, which is how you will recognize another mind should you meet one).
    And of course this is confirmed by your empirical experience of meeting other humans.

    This is just like seeing your first black crow, a single sample, and extrapolating from the characteristics of the crow that "Crows are black, feathered, beaked..." and by this generalization you will be able to recognize the next "crow" that you see.

    To protest that you are not making an inductive inference is like someone protesting he is
    not "walking" while he walks past you.

    Now, if you want to talk about one of the major errors of empiricism, I would be more than happy to go that direction.

    Not that I'm here to defend some strict empiricism, but most criticisms of empiricism that I've seen, especially from theists, seem to attack the most naive form that even the founding empiricists didn't really hold. But that's another story...

    But it is vital to understand that Aquinas sees his arguments as deductive proofs that have empirical premises, not arrived at by induction, but apprehended from the nature of the world.

    Induction isn't simply attached to the nature of the world (if we mean the "natural/empirical" world). It's a form of reasoning, typically from the specific to the general. If your argument contains a premise like: "All minds exhibit X,Y, Z features" the obvious question is to ask "How do you know?" You've clearly stuck an inductively derived premise in there....or you still need to justify that premise. The same goes for whether you are talking about "souls" or "angels."

    Cheers,

    RH

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  36. Hr & dguller,

    I appreciate what you both say with regards to induction. It has made me revisit things and look more deeply.

    I still do not think that Aquinas' arguments employ induction. For instance, in the first way the principle of change is abstracted from an instance of change and apprehended as a first principle. Such a principle cannot be demonstrated (but attempted refutations can be countered), and therefore deduction nor induction is used to come to it.

    Furthermore, it is not quite a case of looking at one group that has certain fundamental principles and then postulating (with a certain degree of probability) what another, larger, group contains. Rather, it is a case of saying this is the essential nature of change. It therefore requires an acknowledgment of essences (something empiricism usually denies).

    For clarity please point out what premise or premises in Aquinas' arguments are arrived at by induction. So we can all be on the same page.

    Thank you.
    Ciao,
    Michael

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  37. HR,

    Also, Aquinas' arguments are not pre-empirical. They contain premises from experience. They just aren't the kind of premises that are open to scientific inquiry because they are presupposed by scientific inquiry.

    The conclusions reached are also necessary, *given* that one accepts the initial premise such as "we find that some things change". But who really wants to deny that?

    Even Kant saw the role for the necessary synthetic, although I would greatly disagree with most of his epistemology.

    So while I might sympathize with you about certain tactics people use to try to justify their claims... it is also important to understand the arguments in question. Perhaps the people you argued with didn't understand the arguments by labeling them "pre-empirical" or even a priori.

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  38. Oh, that's funny. Rh, not Hr. ;)

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  39. Michael:

    Quick question:

    If we are not generalizing from specifics via induction, and seem to absorb the inherent form that accounts for the underlying nature of the specific entity in question, then how can we ever be wrong about the nature of an entity?

    I can understand how we can make a faulty generalization based upon fallacious reasoning or a faulty sample, but I cannot understand how our intellect can take the form of an entity into itself, and then get it totally wrong about what the nature of the entity is.

    Any thoughts?

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  40. dguller,

    Good question. We are now starting to leave the shores I am familiar with.

    I can only comment that yes, you are right... if we do apprehend the form in question then it would seem that there is no more room for error. I guess then that error must arise from the process of abstraction, perhaps from judgments too hastily made when not all the fine detail has yet been apprehended.

    There is no reason why we must grasp a form in its entirety all at once, as far as I can see.

    I for one hope to make a greater study of Aristotle and the foundations of his metaphysics through the analysis of change. Such an analysis it seems, as far as I have gathered, to lead lock-in-step to some of his notions such as form and matter.

    Perhaps someone more knowledgeable about Aristotelianism and/or Thomism can answer your question? That is, if anyone else is still reading such a long thread!

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  41. Isn't his just one giant "true-scottsman" fallacy? "No 'smart' theist makes this arugment. Yeah, I know--you hear it everyday from every theist you know. But they aren't really smart. A really smart theist would never make this argument. So why are new atheists attacking it?" I'll tell you why--becuase new atheists are trying to dubunk the BS arguments that people hear all the time, and this is one of them! It's not a straw man and it's not unfair. It is an arugment people use that deserves a good shallacking--because "God knows" no theist philosopher is ever going to bother applying careful criticism to arguments of thier own. (For example, I don't see Feser pointing out the 15 fallacies a minute spouted by William Lane Craig.)

    On, and btw--this argument you say no one gives IS Aquinas' second way. "Every event has a cause, every cause is an event, the chain can't go on infintely, so there is a first cause." All the criticism you say dont' apply to any amrt theist's argumen apply to it.

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  42. Michael:

    Good luck. Let me know if you find a good answer to this apparent problem.

    Thanks. :)

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  43. Another atheist who cannot comprehend simple English says: this argument you say no one gives IS Aquinas' second way. "Every event has a cause, every cause is an event, the chain can't go on infinitely, so there is a first cause."

    Apparently the "chain of ignorance" is one chain that can go on infinitely!

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  44. Dguller and Michael:

    I can understand how we can make a faulty generalization based upon fallacious reasoning or a faulty sample, but I cannot understand how our intellect can take the form of an entity into itself, and then get it totally wrong about what the nature of the entity is.

    Our concepts can be "confused," but they can't be wrong. The only thing that is wrong is when we make a judgment using those concepts in the form of a proposition.

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  45. Josh,

    So is it fair to say this:

    "I guess then that error must arise from the process of abstraction, perhaps from judgments too hastily made when not all the fine detail has yet been apprehended."

    Or are any of the words I used misleading... or incorrect?

    And what do you think about the claim that Aquinas' arguments use induction? True or false?

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  46. Someone upthread said the CA reasoning was inductive. I may be wrong now, but when we have:
    Major premise:
    Every contingent thing has a cause.
    Minor premise:
    A thing cannot be a cause of itself.
    Conclusion:
    The Universe has a cause,

    how on earth can this be inductive?

    On this basis, could we say the following proposition is also inductive?
    M:
    Every woman is a human being.
    m:
    All humans are mortal.
    C:
    All women are mortal.

    One could, of course, now say this ain't deductive because we don't know if all humans are mortal. Has anyone checked it empirically? If you're talking from experience, then surely it becomes a statistic, hence inductive.
    Any thoughts?

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  47. Good point! I too fail to see what aspect of Aquinas' CA is inductive.

    My current theory is that some are conflating experiential foundations with induction and the scientific method.

    It appears as if the problem is Scientism to those who realize the proper distinctions, even though the person making the claim probably does indeed accept many other standards of evidence in thought and practice.

    Ciao,
    Michael

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  48. I think the only reasonable opposition to the CA comes from Schopenhaur who said the change we see around us is not a fact of existence but transformation. The only time something came into existence was at the beginning. From then on, it is all transformation, different permutations of the matter-energy substrate. Hence, Schopenhaur claims the proposition "everything that begins to exist" is not valid and so is the claim that existence needs a cause. Only transformations do.
    Any thoughts? I find myself hitting a dead-end in this seemingly intractable reasoning.

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  49. "The only time something came into existence was at the beginning. From then on..."

    First, Aquinas CA does not depend on things coming into existence, it could very well be that things always existed. Aquinas will take both as starting points.

    Second, whether or not the change is substantial (something going out and another coming into existence) or accidental (what you label here as transformation) it is still change and a fact of existence, existence in the sense of reality (and not as coming into existence, becoming, as per the definition in your post).

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  50. mnd is such a powerful hub and believe me our control on our mind differentiate us from animals and even god.



    engineering interview questions and answers

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  51. @Feser

    This only goes to show that, ultimately, the cosmological argument is unable to come up with an answer that is relevant in anything other than who is better at creating mental fun houses.

    As a first principle, what diseases has the cosmological argument cured? NONE.

    Gloat all you want about how smart understanding all the facets of the cosmological argument makes you and how stupid it makes New Atheists or followers of Scientism. At least those scientists you criticize have given genuine tangible improvements to understanding.

    This is why us "New Atheists" "fail" at philosophy. We "fail" at philosophy in the same way millionaires "fail" at being poor and/or useful.

    If science cannot answer the cosmological argument as you claim, and as I am being convinced by, then any possible solution to the cosmological argument can similarly not answer anything useful for which "God" was posited as a solution for in the first place. As such, the "God" explanation of the cosmological argument is ultimately incompatible with a theistic God no matter the flavour of theism because it is impotent as an practical explanation.

    In that sense, it is the same as Last Thursdayism. There is absolutely nothing anyone can prove or argue that "what comes into existence must have begun Last Thursday". It could be completely utterly true and thus utterly useless for anything but to prove itself. It is tautological purely on the virtue of its existence.

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  52. This is a fascinating post and thread.
    What I want to know is slightly beside the point but has to do with the comments. It is: how come there is an idea floating around that radioactive decay is uncaused? Is this a real scientific idea? Where did you find it?
    It seems to me that the only way science could say it was uncaused was by reducing the radioactive substance to absolute zero. Otherwise, the general motion of the atoms would trigger the decay. Wouldn't it?
    I'm not by any means an expert on this at all, and am trying to understand it.
    What would be helpful is if you could reference some of the actual scientific studies that suggest radioactive decay has no cause. I can't find anything about that isn't part of a philosophical argument. I want to know where the philosophers got it from! :)
    Saskia

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  53. But why is it not like this: That nothing exist ,not humans and the universe and God.Why do God exist instead of nothing ?

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  54. I do not understand the cosmological argument.I do not understand why everything that is contingent need to have a cause.

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  55. Hi Ed, thanks for the brilliant bog.

    first of all i would like to say as a student taking philosophy at 'a level' (i'm not sure what the equivalent is in america) how extremely refreshing it is, whilst siphoning off bits of information on the cosmological argument, to put in my essays, that i find a blogger with very similar views as me.

    i am glad to see that i am not the only one, who is tired of atheists like Dawkins spoiling the name and rich history of the cosmological argument, by arguing points that are redundant to most people who study the argument. His staunch approach against atheism seems to blind him from the fact that his points, whilst seeming intellectual, carry no real weight. Since most people agree, that Dawkins only has a basic knowledge of philosophy, one which he gained from speaking with various philosophers, he lacks the most important and crucial areas of the argument, which he tries to make up for with his scientific knowledge. This, just doesn't seem to work for me.

    To conclude, i would like to say that in Britain, any book with the name 'God' in it sells at rapid rates. The more I read about these books, the more I seem to think that whilst trying to create the book 'The God delusion' Richard Dawkins has created the 'Dawkins delusion'. A delusion, where anyone with a brief knowledge about God can share their (contaminated) views on the cosmological argument. I say contaminated, because i think that, like you, the line between what most people believe to be the cosmological argument, and what the cosmological argument actually is, seems to be blurring all the time.

    Thank you for taking the time to read this (if you get round to it) and sharing your much appreciated views on the cosmological argument! :)

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  56. @Bobcat who said: "I don't think Robin Le Poidevin is an atheist any longer. I believe he has converted to agnosticism."

    I'm not entirely certain he ever actually did consider himself an atheist in the first place, but he doesn't at the moment. My source is the horse's mouth in this interview I did with him.

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  57. Is the comment above by 'GentleSkeptic' ('CluelessSkeptic' would be a more accurate label, in my humble opinion) some sort of attempt at creating a witty response, or merely the desperate need for self-assurance masked as such?

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  58. I do not agree with the first premise even in the form it is presented here. I have never observed anything coming into existence nor have I seen evidence of such event having a cause. I find it equally likely that the premise might be false or totally meaningless. The evolution of this universe is simply movement which of course is causal, but it has nothing to do with anything coming into existence. I see no justification for the first premise.

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  59. I find it odd that you haven't even discussed some very serious philosophers who discussed the question of a first cause in detail. Why no mention of the Diamond Cutter Sutra, Nagarjuna or Chandrakirti?

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  60. Very good. I have recently been plagued by the objection that the Unmoved First Mover is not something is personal, it cannot call itself an " I . " And though I showed how it was a personal, intelligent, simple,personal, Being, it was just thrown in my face. The " club " athiest will not give an inch.

    Yes, I can see how the First way could be missunderstood. In an eternal universe the First Efficient Cause would be eternally bringing into existence and maintaining in existence.

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  61. "What defenders of the cosmological argument do say is that what comes into existence has a cause"

    Does the argument then depend on assuming the philosophy of time known as "presentism", in which future and past events have a fundamentally different ontological status than past events? In the alternative view, known as "eternalism" or "four-dimensionalism", all events throughout spacetime have the same ontological status (the versions of me in 2010 and 2020 are just as real as the version writing this in 2012), and the word "now" only has meaning relative to the person using the word, much like "here". Physics can never settle philosophical questions, but the fact that relativity says different "frames of references" have different definitions of simultaneity, and that no possible physical experiment could pick out one frame as more "correct" than any other, tends to suggest by Occam's razor that we should favor the latter metaphysical view, and I think most modern analytic philosophers would indeed take such a view. If this view is correct, then can't we say that the entire 4-dimensional spacetime we live in is an example of a thing that never "came into existence", and thus the cosmological argument would not apply to it?

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  62. At any rate, I feel as if Mr. Rosenhouse misunderstood Dr. Feser's whole post. He quotes the section of the book Dr. Feser mentions. It says exactly what Dr. Feser claims it said. He then says afterward that since it is only a "basic example to build on", Feser was wrong. Then he says that the difference between that and Dr. Feser's monkey argument is that the monkey argument isn't true.

    Here's a gem from right inside his whole combox that more or less completely undermines Mr. Rosenhouse's point:



    1. How could the thief have broken in without being seen by the guards? He would have to have been invisible!

    2. But no man is invisible!

    3. Therefore the thief was a woman!

    That’s the squirmy little dodge that the cosmological argument centers around. You can’t argue that everything has a cause other than itself, because then God needs a cause other than himself. So you argue that everything that “X” needs a cause other than itself, and claim that God doesn’t “X.” But it does not follow from the claim “everything that X has a Y” that “everything (or even some things) that not X does not have a Y.” That needs to be justified.

    This is particularly true when you’ve given reasons why “everything that X has a Y.” You need to make sure those reasons don’t prove more than you want them to.

    Naturally this entire issue is glossed over whenever the argument is presented.


    It's amazing that they don't realize that this blog post is addressing the EXACT sorts of silly objections posted here. And this from people who think the book Dr. Feser so negatively quotes features a good discussion of the argument! And we're supposed to trust people like that to talk logically about the cosmological argument?

    Ridiculous.

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  63. Feser wrote:

    "...not William Lane Craig, not Richard Swinburne. And not anyone else either, as far as I know. (Your Pastor Bob doesn’t count. I mean no one among prominent philosophers.)"

    I don't know about others, but what is WLC doing here (and in rest of the YouTube hits)?

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmdQ7-iJTG8

    Btw. The "new atheists" talk about this example because it's commonly seen and heard in the every day religious circles.

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  64. someone check out this garbage:

    http://fatfist.hubpages.com/hub/UNCAUSED-FIRST-CAUSE-Argument-for-Creation-REFUTED

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  65. Edward Feser,

    I don;t believe in your god one bit. I also reject the cosmological argument, and I think that you have not interacted with serious objections to "the real thing," for at least I have interacted with William Lane Craig's as stated by the guy. But even then, I like your post a lot. It lead me to understand that the form of the argument is important and why. I warn you though that lots of Christians use that argument, and that you can't fault atheists for not knowing that "whatever begins to exist has a cause" is the first premise rather than "everything has a cause." I understood you. I get it. There's a difference. I shall make sure I don't use the wrong version if I discuss this again with some Christian. I enjoyed your explanation for being a tad more down to earth than the obscure stuff we most often see. I felt you lost precious space overexplaining some parts, that you could have used to clarify other things, but you were still quite informative. So thanks.

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  66. Will,

    Before anything, I must clarify that materialism has been upgraded into what's called physicalism. I also note that I am no physicalist because to me, physicality is more of a conclusion, rather than a starting principle. Should something else come to my attention I can change my position that so far all looks quite physical, and nothing looks either supernatural or spiritual. Nothing convincing, anyway.

    You presented:

    (1) If materialism is true, then a) only matter exists and b) matter is governed by the laws of physics and nothing else.

    Well, since we are talking about physicalism, then we should change that to something like:

    (1) If physicalism is true, then a) only physical reality exists and b) this reality is governed by the laws of physics and nothing else.

    "b)" up there would be true as a tautology. Physical reality is governed by physical laws whether we know those laws or not. b is true by definition. Nothing wrong there as far as I can see.

    (2) A law of physics is either stochastic (based on randomness) or deterministic (based on rule).

    This is a false dichotomy. We know of a lot of processes that depend on some stochasticity yet follow some patterns (which might be thought as deterministic). For example, a number of particles might be floating around randomly, but as they collide they can start forming a lump, and the gravitation of the lump might grab more particles, and so on ... you would have a hard time calling gravitation "stochastic," and the whole process to be completely "stochastic."

    (3) So if humans can make rational choices, which are neither determined by rule nor random, then materialism is certainly false.

    Well, since you started with a false dichotomy this is wrong even if we change that "materialism" to "physicalism."

    (4) Humans can make rational choices.

    Or so we suppose and hope. But I concede that at least it looks as if we can.

    Therefore, (5) materialism is certainly false.

    Therefore this argument is certainly bogus.

    Then the next ...

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  67. Will you continued:

    Numbers, the language of physics, don't fare any better:

    Well, if we are to judge for how your prior argument fared ... but this one seems much ore elaborate in the way(s) it equivocates. I shall give it a try, but I think we will never reach an agreement because of "language" barriers.

    (1) If there were no material objects, then the number of material objects would be zero.

    A tautology. Not a fallacious one though. Oh, now I see. You are claiming that even without nothing "numbers" would exist because zero is a number? Wrong. Nonexistence is nonexistence. That you can conceptualize emptiness as a number does not mean that the number still exists. It only means that you can conceptualize it that way. An equivocation between a concept and an actuality. (I suspect we will never be able to get you to understand how this fails.)

    (2) Numbers aren’t just ideas in our minds, because mathematical truths (e.g., ‘317 is prime’) would still be true if there were no human minds.

    If there were nothing, the number of things would be zero, and therefore there would be no way of having 317, and therefore no way of dividing the number, and no way for it to be prime. For the number to be prime it has to be divisible by itself and by 1. So, you need something to exist, even if not human minds, in order for 317 to be a prime number. Therefore this depends on there being a physical reality to be true. (I suspect we will never be able to get you to understand how this fails either.)

    (3) So numbers cannot be identified with anything either material or mental.

    False. Numbers can only be identified with either physical objects or mental abstractions. No way around. Again, if nothing existed, then no numbers.

    Therefore, (4) materialism is false.

    Therefore you have some talent at equivocations. (but materialism is false by definition, not everything is matter, there's energy, anti-matter, quantum fluctuations, gravitation, et cetera ... yet the conclusion that everything seems to be physical seems to stand against your arguments so far. Since this is the first time I see this I might have overlooked a few more compounded fallacies.)

    ...

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  68. Will, final one:

    And, using only materialist premisses, it's easy to show that beliefs go the same way:

    I wouldn't count on that given your faulty arguments before.

    (1) If beliefs are anything, then they are brain states;

    What?

    (2) beliefs exhibit original intentionality;

    Not always. Often beliefs just exhibit beliefs. What the heck is "original" intentionality?

    (3) no physical state, and thus no brain state, exhibits original intentionality;

    Says who? I think you meant that no physical state that you know exhibits whatever you mean by "original" intentionality. Seems like a genetic fallacy (you do not know of simpler physical states exhibiting original intentionality, therefore complex physical states should not exhibit original intentionality, whatever that means). I suspect a fallacy of incredulity hidden much deeper than your argument displays.

    Therefore, (4) there are no beliefs.

    Therefore you have a talent to take your preferred assumptions for granted. I think these assumptions are way too common among creationists, many of whom have not even updated their "philosophies" to acknowledge that materialism has been updated into physicalism, and that they have outdated, and ungrounded, assumptions lingering behind their philosophies.

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  69. Will,

    When asked about "original intentionality" you smugly posted a series of links, all of which point to "intentionality," but not to "original intentionality." What about next time you actually help with a simple, short explanation of what you mean, and why the adjective "oroginal" is important. You can add links fi you want. but the links pointed mostly to absurdly long diatribes about intentionality. None to "original" one. That's not much help.

    I was nauseated by this one by the way:
    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/05/coyne-on-intentionality.html

    What a load of ... rhetorics. But I am deviating from the point: what the heck is original intentionality?

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  70. I think Feser tends to employ a rhetorical edge when he feels that someone else is using it against him or his metaphysics/philosophy in general. Which seems fair enough.

    And I think original intentionality refers to intrinsic intentionality.

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  71. Excellent post, I don't think I've ever seen such a simple outline of the weak objections to the cosmological argument! I've discussed this argument at length in various places and I have indeed slipped up and used the wrong wording to say that "everything has a cause." I fairly recently read/listened to a Peter Kreeft lecture about Aquinas' ways and I wrote a blog entry about it: http://www.samuelronicker.com/2013/08/the-philosophy-of-thomas-aquinas-part-4.html

    Last and least... could you widen the text portion of your blog, it makes it easier to read if I don't have to scroll down as much. I will definitely be following, glad I've found your site!

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  72. I posted on my own blog page (http://txtpub.blogspot.com.br/2014/03/essaying-one-answer-and-some-additional_17.html)some ideas that wouldn't fit into this comment box.
    Regards,

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  73. Claudio Di GregorioJuly 22, 2014 at 8:05 AM

    You say that the definition “everything has a cause; so the universe has a cause; so God exists” is not the cosmological argument. You argue that, instead, the real cosmological argument goes “What comes into existence has a cause. Or “What is contingent has a cause”.

    Thus, you conclude that the question “What caused the (thing that cannot in principle have had a cause)?” ends up being ridiculous and a contradiction in terms. I agree: nothing caused a thing that does not have a cause.

    So what? What you did (or what Aquinas did; I couldn't care less whether your definition of the cosmological argument is or is not the “authentic” definition) is tilting the plain field by changing the definition of God in a way that it can no longer be falsifiable. Now you have said “What has existed forever cannot have a cause”. Of course. If you arbitrarily define God as “existing forever”, or as “necessary”, then God is not contingent and never came into existence. Therefore he doesn't have a cause. A sterling example of a reasoning that is as unstoppable as it is circular and useless.

    By simplifying your parallel, you say that “everything is X” does not correspond to the real cosmological argument; that the right formulation of the argument would be “Whatever has color is X”. In addition to the fact that parallels are not evidence or arguments --just parallels-- I believe your parallel is not even really a parallel. The correct “cosmological” formulation in your parallel would be “What is X is X”. It is hard to find a clearest tautology than that.

    It took you so many paragraphs –most dedicated to destroying straw man arguments– to prove a reasoning that you'd win by walk-over anyway: your god that doesn't have a cause because by definition he doesn't have a cause.

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  74. I am an "atheist" -- as defined by theists, at least -- but I think this post addresses an embarrassment that grates on my nerves to no end. As a serious student of philosophy, I think you hit the nail on the head here. The typical atheist objections to the Cosmological Argument are severe failures to understand the argument's basic thrust, which is quite subtle, and their counterarguments are glaring examples of arrogant and lazy thinking. However, I would go one step further: one might get the impression from your analysis that one must be rather sophisticated philosophically to see through the shallow objections most atheists use to brush the Cosmological Argument under the rug; but I think that the philosophical bankruptcy of typical atheist counterarguments is apparent even to people who have no philosophical training. Many people cannot articulate philosophical ideas with any kind of accuracy or detail, but that doesn't mean that they don't have an intuitive feel for the issue and understand that an objection like "Then what caused God?" misses the point entirely. Non-philosophers like Dawkins -- who I admire immensely as a biologist and scientific thinker -- should really stay away from these sorts of discussions, as they do more harm than good to their (my) cause.

    I wouldn't describe myself exactly as a theist, but I do and have always accepted the Cosmological Argument. You clearly know a great deal about the Thomistic arguments, which have never quite clicked with me, but the contingency versions by Leibniz et al. are convincing for me. Hume and Kant notwithstanding. The way I see it, there are ways out of it, but all of them seem to involve an ad-hoc claim, usually using some spurious and poorly understood aspect of quantum physics, to the effect that e.g. the PSR doesn't hold for probabilistic events. It may be rationally defensible to take a position like this, but I can't do honestly do it. I suspect that atheists get overzealous and feel the need to have a rejection for all theistic arguments, even when they're aware that, as you pointed out, the success of the Cosmological Argument doesn't entail any particular variety of theism. I would even argue that it doesn't entail theism at all -- merely that it establishes the existence of a necessary being. Theological arguments beyond that point which argue that the necessary being must necessarily be the omnipredicate God of classical theism are entirely separate arguments that, in my opinion, are not nearly so successful.

    I am certainly not a typical "atheist", but I wanted to thank you for your excellent post and let you know (if you're still maintaining this site) that not all the people in the other camp are philosophically incompetent or intellectually dishonest.

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  75. Hi Anonymous,
    Your question about unactualized potentials in God is a good one. I'm not sure where Dr. Feser answers it, though I think it's addressed in Summa Contra Gentiles in Book 1, Chapter 82, "ARGUMENTS LEADING TO AWKWARD CONSEQUENCES IF GOD DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF". The "awkward argument" I think you allude to is:

    "[2] For, if with respect to certain objects the will of God is not determined to them, it would seem to be disposed to opposites. But every power that is disposed to opposites is in a manner in potency, since “to opposites” is a species of the contingent possible. Therefore, there is potency in the will of God, which will consequently not be the substance of God, in which there is no potency, as was shown above. "

    If I understand correctly, that God could have created other things does not entail that he has unactualized potentials. Compare human potentials: I can read Plato's Republic or Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, and in each case my power to read is fully actualized. It is not more actualized in one case than the other, and it does not fail to be actualized if I just read Aristotle. Or consider walking: there is a power to walk, but there are no separate powers to walk to the left and to walk to the right, or a separate power to walk to the library on a Tuesday wearing a hat. Whichever way we walk, we exercise the same power, and it is completely actualized. God's power to create is fully actualized, whatever he creates.

    While there seems to be something right about that, I'm not sure what the general principle of individuation of powers is supposed to be. I am assuming that powers and potentials are the same here.

    Mike

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  76. Hi Anonymous,
    I should add that this is the passage I referred to where Aquinas responds to the "awkward argument" that concludes that God, by not creating some things, has unactualized potentials:

    "From the side of its object, a certain power is found open to opposites when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither alternative, though both can be. An example is an art which can use diverse instruments to perform the same work equally well. This openness does not pertain to the imperfection of a power, but rather to its eminence, in so far as it dominates both alternatives, and thereby is determined to neither, being open to both. This is bow the divine will is disposed in relation to things other than itself. For its end depends on none of the other things, though it itself is most perfectly united to its end. Hence, it is not required that any potentiality be posited in the divine will. "

    Michael

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  77. Very unconvincing. What caused god is still a valid question as it doesn't offer any *explanation* that attempts to reconcile a mere philosophical assertion (about something that we know nothing about) with known physics. It's ignorant humans applying our zero insight (false logic) regarding something we know nothing of, while ignoring that which we do know about/reality (which is always far more complex than we can ever imagine and which, so far, provides zero signs of any deities).

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  78. "What defenders of the cosmological argument do say is that what comes into existence has a cause..."

    Which is just moving the special pleading into the definition. The very notion that there could even be something that didn't come into existence defines "God" into existence.

    So yes, the argument does state that everything has a cause--except God. And by the same it's perfectly valid to ask "What caused God?"

    And yes, of course you'll continue to pretend it isn't, because you arrived at the conclusion many years ago and are simply searching for rationalizations to continue believing in it.

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  79. "So, to ask “What caused God?” really amounts to asking “What caused the thing that cannot in principle have had a cause?”"

    The same can be said for asking what caused material existence as opposed to absolutely nothing at all.

    Feser is simply defining god into existence with mere special pleading. This is a pointless argument that can be applied to any proposed alternative to god.

    Undoubtedly, there is an existence as opposed to absolutely nothing at all. It is not possible that there could be no existence because there is an existence, thus the probability of existence is 1.

    The idle speculation of god has no special claim to being the necessary thing that cannot have a cause, and to assert such a special property by definition is just special pleading and defining god into existence, which is a glaringly lame argument.

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  80. P.S. I'm not just calling Feser names because he used a picture of me for this article. I think that was low blow, but I would be just as dismissive of his argument even if I had read any further than the picture!

    ReplyDelete
  81. Anonymous Stardusty Psyche said...

    " P.S. I'm not just calling Feser names "
    False premise. I did not call Feser a name, I characterized one of his arguments as lame. Nor did I merely characterize one of his arguments as lame, rather, I first provided my reasons as to why the argument is so bad, then provided my characterization of the argument.

    "because he used a picture of me for this article."
    Now who is calling names?

    " I think that was low blow,"
    Indeed, calling me a dunce is a low blow. Unlike you, apparently, I am capable of distinguishing between a faulty argument put forth by an individual and the general level of competency of that individual.

    " but I would be just as dismissive of his argument even if I had read any further than the picture!"
    Your comment contains no argumentation, whereas mine of March 17, 2017 at 4:15 PM does. If you care to offer some sort of counter argument, fine, but simply calling me a dunce is yet another lame "argument", rather, no argument at all.

    Scrolling up I see others have made largely the same observation, that Feser is merely defining god into existence with special pleading. That does not make Feser a lame or stupid or ignorant individual generally, palpably, quite the contrary.

    If Feser did not wish to have his argument characterized as "lame" perhaps he should not have opened his post by characterizing "Most people who comment on the cosmological argument demonstrably do not know what they are talking about. This includes all the prominent New Atheist writers. It very definitely includes most of the people who hang out in Jerry Coyne’s comboxes. It also includes most scientists. " as dunces by posting a picture of a kid in a dunce cap next to this sweeping and unfounded dismissal.

    In light of Feser's sweeping insult I think my response was quite measured and tepid.


    March 18, 2017 at 1:33 AM

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  82. Stardusty Psyche: Nor did I merely characterize one of his arguments as lame, rather, I first provided my reasons as to why the argument is so bad, then provided my characterization of the argument.

    Except you didn't provide reasons, you made an unfounded claim about special pleading, and in a way that indicates you didn't understand anything he said in this post, let alone any of his other writing about the Cosmological argument.

    Scrolling up I see others have made largely the same observation, that Feser is merely defining god into existence with special pleading.

    Yeah, other people who didn't understand the article. I'm especially amused by Anonymous above who says, 'The very notion that there could even be something that didn't come into existence defines "God" into existence.' — which could only be true if the Ontological Argument works, i.e. he is claiming that the Cosmological Argument fails because the Ontological Argument succeeds. Well, that's a new one to me, but hey, it's always nice to see a new supporter of the OA.

    If Feser did not wish to have his argument characterized as "lame"

    I'm confident that Feser couldn't care less how you and other anonymous posters who failed to read the article characterise his argument.

    ReplyDelete
  83. Anonymous said...

    " Except you didn't provide reasons,"
    Actually, I did, but I don't need long diffuse commentary to make my point.

    Feser "So, to ask “What caused God?” really amounts to asking “What caused the thing that cannot in principle have had a cause?”"

    SP" The same can be said for asking what caused material existence as opposed to absolutely nothing at all.

    " you made an unfounded claim about special pleading,"
    I am sorry you do not recognize that I pointed out how the speculation of god as a thing which in principle cannot have a cause is special pleading relative to asking about material existence that cannot have a cause relative to absolutely nothing at all.

    In other words, creation ex nihlio can be said to be irrational since there is nothing about nothing that can cause anything, much less the origin of existence. Therefore one can just as easily merely define material existence as not requiring a cause.

    There are in principle an unbounded number of specific formulations of speculations that we can merely define as the one speculation that in principle does not require a cause, making the assertion of that property to any one speculation, such as god, mere special pleading and nothing better than defining god into existence.

    This is all rather fundamental argumentation that should have been clear from my summary statement. I am sorry you did not recognize this.


    "I'm confident that Feser couldn't care less how you and other anonymous posters who failed to read the article characterise his argument."
    On what do you base that confidence? Can you read his mind perhaps? What makes you so sure I did not read the article, are you spying on me through my microwave ?-)

    Do you suppose that the article is so overwhelmingly convincing that if I had read it I would never have characterized any of Feser's arguments in it as lame and you therefore conclude that I must not have read it?

    You seem to be disparaging the value of the opinion of an anonymous poster, yet you post as "anonymous". Is this an indication that you think the value of your own post is low and to reasonably be dismissed?


    March 19, 2017 at 7:50 PM

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  84. Stardusty Psyche: The same can be said for asking what caused material existence as opposed to absolutely nothing at all.

    No, it can't, as Feser has explained many times over, but even if it did, so what? If somehow the same thing could be said of matter, then it would be just as wrong. So you are ignorant of the facts and wrong on the logic.

    I am sorry you do not recognize that I pointed out how the speculation of god as a thing which in principle cannot have a cause is special pleading

    Again, he has given many arguments for this. That you do not know what they are does not make it special pleading.

    Therefore one can just as easily merely define material existence as not requiring a cause.

    Now that would be special pleading. And I'm sure you could do it easily, I'll bet you're very good at it, in fact.

    There are in principle an unbounded number of specific formulations of speculations that we can merely define as the one speculation that in principle does not require a cause

    You are welcome to cite anywhere that Feser "defines" this. Go ahead, I'll wait.

    This is all rather fundamental argumentation that should have been clear from my summary statement. I am sorry you did not recognize this.

    Sorry, that's my fault — I thought by "argumentation" you meant "series of rational deductions" not "tone-deaf repetition of pre-canned misguided bullet points that the very article being replied to discredits".

    On what do you base that confidence? Can you read his mind perhaps?

    Just my keen insight into human nature. You can ask him yourself!

    What makes you so sure I did not read the article, are you spying on me through my microwave ?-)

    Naw, I'm just giving you the benefit of the doubt. If you'd read it, you would surely have tried to come up with objections that actually addressed Feser's points instead of the ones that he just finished explaining miss the point.

    Is this an indication that you think the value of your own post is low and to reasonably be dismissed?

    I think it's exactly what you deserve.

    ReplyDelete
  85. Anonymous Anonymous said...


    SP There are in principle an unbounded number of specific formulations of speculations that we can merely define as the one speculation that in principle does not require a cause

    "You are welcome to cite anywhere that Feser "defines" this"
    I already did (see repeated citation labeled "Feser" below).


    " Naw, I'm just giving you the benefit of the doubt. If you'd read it, you would surely have tried to come up with objections that actually addressed Feser's points instead of the ones that he just finished explaining miss the point."

    Feser does not make the point that the below is special pleading because he does not recognize this obvious defect in his assertion.
    Feser "So, to ask “What caused God?” really amounts to asking “What caused the thing that cannot in principle have had a cause?”"


    There is an unbounded set of speculations to which one may assign the property of in principle it cannot have a cause. To select any one particular such speculation ad hoc as Feser does with god, is special pleading, and of no rational argumentation merit. You do not seem able to express in your own words a counter argument to my assertion of special pleading.

    SP I am sorry you do not recognize that I pointed out how the speculation of god as a thing which in principle cannot have a cause is special pleading.

    "Again, he has given many arguments for this."
    You are apparently unable to provide those arguments in your own words. All you can do is provide a vague reference to some person who you claim has provided some arguments someplace.


    March 21, 2017 at 9:17 PM

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  86. Stardusty Psyche: Anonymous Anonymous said...

    The Anonymous so nice they named me twice!

    I already did (see repeated citation labeled "Feser" below).

    That line you quoted is not a definition. Simply saying that it is because you wish it were does not make it so. Note that he does not say, "to ask that is defined as asking...". He's drawing a conclusion, based on what he's already shown. Even if he were wrong about that conclusion (which of course he isn't), that hardly turns a conclusion into a definition. But feel free to back further up in the argument and show me where he actually "defines" anything relevant to your claim.

    I am sorry you do not recognize that I pointed out how the speculation of god as a thing which in principle cannot have a cause is special pleading.

    Not half as sorry as I am that you don't understand what "special pleading" or "speculation" mean. Once again, claiming that Feser engages in it does not constitute showing how it is.


    All you can do is provide a vague reference to some person who you claim has provided some arguments someplace.

    "Some person" would be Ed Feser (you know, the guy whose post you are "replying" to?), and the "some place" would be where he actually told you the arguments were (including links). Of course, if you had read the post, you would know that, so we have further evidence that you never read it in the first place.

    You are apparently unable to provide those arguments in your own words.

    If you can't be bothered to read Feser's own arguments (that you are supposedly replying to), why should I believe that you'd pay any attention to the same arguments put into my words? The evidence so far indicates that that would be a waste of my time, and this post has already used up my allotted time to waste for today!

    ReplyDelete
  87. Anonymous said...

    " But feel free to back further up in the argument and show me where he actually "defines" anything relevant to your claim."


    Feser: "So, to ask “What caused God?” really amounts to asking “What caused the thing that cannot in principle have had a cause?”"
    Cited March 17, 2017 at 4:15 PM

    Clearly that assertion by Feser is a special pleading definition of god as being the thing in existence that in principle does not have a cause. Thus, Feser merely defines god into existence by an ad hod assertion that his special speculation is the one among an, in principle, unbounded set of counter speculations each one of which might just as well be defined as such.


    March 25, 2017 at 12:28 AM

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  88. Stardusty Psyche: Clearly that assertion by Feser is a special pleading definition of god as being the thing in existence that in principle does not have a cause.

    No, it is clearly not a definition because he does not say "it IS asking..." but rather "it AMOUNTS to asking...". The term "amounts to" indicates that it is not the same thing, but that it leads to the same result, because Feser has already demonstrated that the in-principle-uncaused-cause must exist. Even though you didn't read (or else understand?) the article, you had to scroll past it to get to the comments, so you must have seen that it is longer than that single sentence; in fact, Feser spends several paragraphs leading up to that sentence which you have entirely ignored.

    ReplyDelete
  89. Anonymous Anonymous said...

    Stardusty Psyche: Clearly that assertion by Feser is a special pleading definition of god as being the thing in existence that in principle does not have a cause.

    " No, it is clearly not a definition because he does not say "it IS asking..." but rather "it AMOUNTS to asking...". The term "amounts to" indicates that it is not the same thing,"
    Feser states the definition of god as the thing that cannot in principle have had a cause. The definition is in his statement. If you don't see that I suggest you read it again and again until you comprehend that simple fact.

    "Feser has already demonstrated that the in-principle-uncaused-cause must exist."
    No he didn't. No human being has ever demonstrated that and published such demonstration into general circulation. Further, even is one postulates an uncaused cause it is a non-sequitur, ad hoc, false dichotomy assertion to label that thing as god.


    April 5, 2017 at 11:39 PM

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  90. Stardusty Psyche: No he didn't. No human being has ever demonstrated that and published such demonstration into general circulation.

    Further evidence, if any were needed, that you didn't read the article you're replying to. He even provides the references, for cryin' out loud.

    ReplyDelete
  91. Anonymous Anonymous said...

    Stardusty Psyche: No he didn't. No human being has ever demonstrated that and published such demonstration into general circulation.

    " Further evidence, if any were needed, that you didn't read the article you're replying to. He even provides the references, for cryin' out loud."

    Perhaps you would be so kind as to quote the text where Feser supposedly demonstrates " that the in-principle-uncaused-cause must exist."

    All I read were the usual fallacious theistic assertions. And he has references to more of the same? Well, that is something.

    Nope, sorry, I found no such demonstration. Can you summarize it in your own words? Can you be more specific than "in the article"?

    I did find this:
    "I’m not going to present and defend any version of the cosmological argument here."
    Hmmm... that sounds like Feser explicitly excluded such argument.

    Oh, but it's in some book someplace, right? Sorry, I don't get excited about people claiming to do what's never been done. But by all means, since you are so very familiar with such demonstration, please do state it.


    April 10, 2017 at 12:06 PM

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  92. Stardusty Psyche: Perhaps you would be so kind as to quote the text where Feser supposedly demonstrates " that the in-principle-uncaused-cause must exist."

    No, I wouldn't be that kind. Copying-and-pasting the stuff he's already made public would be silly, you can go read it yourself. And posting the stuff from his published books would be a violation of copyright. (If you can't afford a paperback, try your local library.)

    All I read were the usual fallacious theistic assertions.

    Aha, so you didn't read Feser's article. You should've read that instead.

    Can you summarize it in your own words?

    Of course I can.

    Oh, but it's in some book someplace, right?

    Yes, among other places. Do you ever read books?

    ReplyDelete
  93. Anonymous Anonymous said...

    Stardusty Psyche: Perhaps you would be so kind as to quote the text where Feser supposedly demonstrates " that the in-principle-uncaused-cause must exist."

    " No, I wouldn't be that kind."
    Your lack of kindness is unbecoming of a Christian, but then, perhaps you are not one.

    " Copying-and-pasting the stuff he's already made public would be silly,"
    So you very apparently cannot do so because no such demonstration exists and you are just making excuses.

    " you can go read it yourself."
    I cannot read such a demonstration because none exists, as further evidenced by your failure to produce such here.


    " And posting the stuff from his published books would be a violation of copyright."
    No it isn't. Now you are really desperate for any excuse, obviously. Quoting a book for review is fair use.




    Can you summarize it in your own words?

    " Of course I can."
    Very well then, please do so here now.


    April 11, 2017 at 9:35 PM

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  94. Stardusty Psyche: Your lack of kindness is unbecoming of a Christian, but then, perhaps you are not one.

    Indeed, you do not know. Just as you apparently do not know what Christian charity is. Perhaps you are one of those people who think it means being a gullible doormat. However, Christians are supposed to spend their talents wisely, and will be called to account for every wasted hour. Therefore refusing your facetious request would in fact be the most prudent way for a Christian to handle what is most likely an unserious or unconstructive demand.

    "Copying-and-pasting the stuff he's already made public would be silly,"
    So you very apparently cannot do so because no such demonstration exists and you are just making excuses.


    You're welcome to your opinions, however ...idiosyncratic they may be. At least you didn't dispute the silliness of copying information that you could easily have already read if you weren't wasting time making excuses here.

    I cannot read such a demonstration because none exists, as further evidenced by your failure to produce such here.

    Ah, yes, we already established that you mistakenly think absence of evidence is evidence of absence. Of course, I have also failed to provide any demonstration that 1+1=2, that the Earth is round, or that Charles Darwin was not an imaginary character whose figmental story was a hoax promulgated by the Devil to tempt us to disbelief. So I guess you believe all those things too! Which only reinforces my previous judgement not to waste time copying out text for some science-denying flat-earther.

    No it isn't. Now you are really desperate for any excuse, obviously. Quoting a book for review is fair use.

    You didn't ask for a review, silly. Don't you know the difference? Since it is clear you do not understand any of the metaphysical background necessary to comprehend Feser's argument, I would have to reproduce entire chapters of the book, which would indeed be problematic as far as copyright is concerned. Not to mention unwarranted wear and tear on my typing fingers!

    Very well then, please do so here now.

    Again, I shall politely decline because it would be a foolish use of my time — the material is already available freely on this very website, as well as pedagogically organised in Feser's books. It makes no sense for me to spend hours copying the same text into these limited comment fields because you are too lazy or too unwilling to read the site or pick up a book. In fact, if you are that unwilling, it is either a (rather embarrassing) excuse because you are afraid you won't be able to understand it, or because you just are not interested in actually learning what Feser has to say. Either way, even if I spent the ridiculous amount of time doing that, the odds of accomplishing anything constructive are vanishingly small, so I elect to spend the time being kind to someone who will actually appreciate it.

    ReplyDelete
  95. Anonymous Anonymous said...

    " No it isn't. Now you are really desperate for any excuse, obviously. Quoting a book for review is fair use.

    " You didn't ask for a review, silly. Don't you know the difference?"
    A review of the reasoning of an argument is fair use. I asked for a review of his argument, yes. First one quotes the argument made, then provides supporting arguments or counter arguments according to the viewpoint of the reviewer.

    " Since it is clear you do not understand any of the metaphysical background necessary to comprehend Feser's argument, I would have to reproduce entire chapters of the book,"
    That is what folks in the Midwest call a "snow job". The metaphor refers to putting out a blizzard of words to conceal the lack of a valid argument. The invalid argument then gets lost like a needle in a haystack, to use another folksy metaphor.

    SP Very well then, please do so here now.

    " Again, I shall politely decline because it would be a foolish use of my time — the material is already available freely on this very website,"
    Oh yes, the refuge of the theistic shell game "I don't have the answer but you are wrong because the answer is over there (pointing vaguely into some ill defined location).


    " as well as pedagogically organised in Feser's books. It makes no sense for me to spend hours copying the same text"
    If it takes you hours you do not have a valid argument, only a blizzard of vague nonsense.

    " Either way, even if I spent the ridiculous amount of time doing that,"
    I don't need hours and hours and thousands of words to make an argument, because I make clear, concise, rational arguments, which both you and Feser are palpably incapable of.

    " I elect to spend the time being kind to someone who will actually appreciate it."
    You lack the courage and fortitude to come out of your safe space and engage with those who disagree with you and are capable of enumerating your errors.

    You choose to argue only in an echo chamber with those who already fundamentally agree with you.

    I am an atheist. I rarely post on atheist sites because a mutual admiration society holds no interest for me.

    You are incapable of engaging me on the merits.


    April 22, 2017 at 9:25 PM

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  96. Stardusty Psyche: First one quotes the argument made, then provides supporting arguments or counter arguments according to the viewpoint of the reviewer.

    No, that's a summary and a response, not a review. Of course, a review might include those things, but they are not constitutive. But it doesn't matter anyway: when you don't understand an argument or its philosophical background, you need more explanation, not a summary.

    The metaphor refers to putting out a blizzard of words to conceal the lack of a valid argument.

    Huh, I don't know whether you've never seen an actual blizzard, or you just haven't read a book. I can assure you that folks in the midwest know how to read, and here in the civilised world, reading books is something we do on a regular basis in order to learn things. You should try it some time, it's not nearly as scary as you think!

    Oh yes, the refuge of the theistic shell game "I don't have the answer but you are wrong because the answer is over there (pointing vaguely into some ill defined location).

    If exact citations including functioning hyperlinks are too "ill-defined" for you, maybe reading a book really would be too scary for you.

    If it takes you hours you do not have a valid argument,

    So you judge the truth of an argument by how fast I can type? I gotta admit, I did not expect that, even from you.

    I don't need hours and hours and thousands of words to make an argument,

    ...because you skip past all those time-wasting snow-jobs like "logic" and "evidence", we know, we know!

    You lack the courage and fortitude to come out of your safe space and engage with those who disagree with you and are capable of enumerating your errors.

    Now that's not really fair. Just because you're incapable of enumerating my errors doesn't mean I don't argue with other people who know what they're talking about.

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  97. Anonymous Anonymous said...

    Stardusty Psyche: First one quotes the argument made, then provides supporting arguments or counter arguments according to the viewpoint of the reviewer.
    " Of course, a review might include those things, "
    Which makes quoting Feser fair use and you just an excuse maker.


    " Huh, I don't know whether you've never seen an actual blizzard, "
    Yes, I have been in real blizzards and reading Feser is metaphorically a blizzard of meandering words.

    " If exact citations including functioning hyperlinks are too "ill-defined" "
    You provided no hyperlinks to the text containing your arguments. "Go read a book" is a particularly weak form of argument.

    " So you judge the truth of an argument by how fast I can type? "
    In part, yes. If you can't figure out how to make your point in less than hours you do not know what you are talking about.

    For example
    Anonymous said...

    Stardusty Psyche: Perhaps you would be so kind as to quote the text where Feser supposedly demonstrates " that the in-principle-uncaused-cause must exist."

    " No, I wouldn't be that kind. "

    SP Can you summarize it in your own words?
    " Of course I can."
    SP Very well then, please do so here now.
    April 11, 2017 at 9:35 PM

    So, in 18 days, with hundreds of words typed by you, still no summary you claim to be able to produce.

    You have many excuses, copyright, time, typing speed etc. Yet no actual content on the subject of the OP a demonstration " that the in-principle-uncaused-cause must exist."

    You and Feser share that trait, long meandering off-topic assertions, yet no actual demonstration of the claim at hand.

    I say Feser argues in the form of defining god into existence. Both you and Feser have failed to demonstrate otherwise, your only response being "go read a book", since you have no demonstrated capacity to actually make a sound argument as to why god must exist.


    April 29, 2017 at 2:58 AM

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  98. Well this was interesting. I kind of want to read "The Last Superstition."

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  99. (2) and (3) of your elimination of free will are incorrect... (2) suggests physical laws are *based* are either stochastic or determinstic, yet science posits neither claim. Laws are how things work, the resultant behaviours, including complex emergent behaviours of complex systems, may well be stochastic, but that doesn't imply the laws themselves are such. Likewise, systems governed by laws may behave deterministically, but that doesn't mean the laws themselves are. In general, the observable behaviour of a phystical system does not tell us that the governing laws have either property. (3) is an if statement... what justifies the assumption? It begs the question of whether human minds can make 'rational' decisions. Yes they can, btw, as can computer programs. I'm aware of no evidence that the mind has outputs that can neither be deterministic nor stochasti nor dependent on any sub-process, system or law of either type. That remains entirely to be demonstrated!

    Who's denying (4)? It's not controversial, is it?

    You just can't reach (5) because (2) is false and (3) is assumed, undemonstrated and contrary to observed reality (but not, per se, offered as impossible)

    Your following two arguments are equally fallacious, fwiw, for broadly similar reasons.

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  100. My overarching concern with this rebuttal to atheist's responses to the Cosmological Argument, is that Feser does not acknowledge what exactly the atheists ARE responding to. OK, so it's not his highly-advanced, several-hundred-page epic version of the CA, but so what? I'm an atheist who has debated religion for years, and I've never ever seen a complex or deeply argued version of the CA of any kind. Those simplistic responses that Feser doesn't like? They're perfectly valid responses to what many theists and apologists ARE presenting in debates and apologias everywhere. If Feser has a bone to pick, it should be with his fellow theists, religious philosophers and apologists for failing themselves to properly present Aquinas' original arguments.

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  101. In all these years, it never occured to you to read the works of an actual philosopher of religion?

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  102. I had somebody tell me today that the argument from motion fails because we can't prove that potency is ALWAYS reduced to act by act... and they're dead serious about it.

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  103. "Your comment will be visible after approval."
    Moderating a philosophy discussion.
    The irony.

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  104. "what comes into existence has a cause"

    It looks like everything stems from this premise. And the irony is he thinks this is better than the traditional "everything has a cause so there must be a first cause." but it's the same type of argument, even less witty! NEITHER statement hold any more truth than me saying "Everything that exists has no cause." It's fairy dust. It's a statement based completely on faith, hopes and dreams, fairy dust, unicorns, miracle whip, what the French call a certain, 'I don't know what'. It has no inherent truth and is funnily actually intellectually dishonest. It's good for philosophy so we can deconstruct it but it's just so completely inept!

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  105. There are several forms of the argument so it would take too long; it would take too long even to present one form of the argument completely.
    I suggest you read William Lane Craig's 1977 PhD Thesis (available free on the internet) which explains the main versions of the argument.

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  106. That is the sleight of hand. Build a bunch of straw men using utterances used by unknown people in debates.

    The Kalam argument most certainly assumes that the universe had a beginning. But Feser handwaves that away. He claims that it does not just assume it, but it establishes it. Note that "the universe had a beginning" is at least a quasi-scientific claim, and no way Kalam established it.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam_cosmological_argument#Form_of_the_argument

    Pretty clear in 2. that the form that WLC uses most definitely assumes it. It is not established by the argument.

    Things work better when you destroy straw men, but not to prove an argument

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  107. What a peculiar blog! What a juxtaposition: You’ve managed to surprise me and offer something I haven’t seen in a long time—complex, interesting writing that is genuinely thought-provoking, instead of smoke-and-mirrors self-delusion of most online theistic philosophy – and then at the same time the comments are filled with exactly such predictable empty nonsense.

    It’s funny getting to read most in one place.

    The only thing notable about your commentors is they seem to think that because they’re here reading you, they are smarter than everybody else, and they aren’t afraid to say it. Which isn’t really surprising, given the tenor of this blog as a whole. I don’t think I’ve ever seen anybody fill the HEADER of their own blog with quotes about how damn smart they are. Most people who are genuinely brilliant just write smart things, and let people read; they don’t have to first TELL us how smart they are.

    The god you describe here, of course, is nothing like the god which traditional Christianity has taught for the past 2,000 years. I don’t care if the Christian philosophers thought differently; this is not the god that was preached from the pulpit, discussed in the pews, or prayed to by the populace. It’s nothing more than attempt to wed a high-concept abstract idea to a very low-concept anthropomorphic superstition.

    I have many other objections, but with this great number of comments I suspect they’ve all been said before better than I could. Cheers!

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  108. Hello everyone,

    When Dr. Feser says "I’ll let Mr. Natural tell us what it means. " That hyperlink is broken. Does anyone know the where the hyperlink was supposed to take you? Thank you!

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    1. It went to this cover:

      https://www.comics.org/issue/364600/cover/4/

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  109. Everything observed "within* the universe that began to exist has a cause. I have never read Feser, Lane Craig, or anyone else defeat this objection.

    In any matter, the arguments are aimed to *persuade*. Sophisticated speculation only.

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